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HERMOGENA G. ENGRESO WITH SPOUSE JOSE ENGRESO v. NESTORIA DE LA CRUZ

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

2007-12-10
AZCUNA, J.
The 120 square meters less the hereditary share of Paz Lachica which is 26.6666 square meters, or the 93.3333 square meters of the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 1151, belong to the appellants, being the heirs of the late Feliciano Aquillo, Jr. and Luz Aquillo.  x x x.[38] Considering that Paz Lachica owns only 26.6666 square meters of the 120-square meter property and the remaining 93.3333-square meter portion thereof is owned by the respondents, the former could only validly sell the portion which rightfully belonged to her. However, considering that Paz Lachica, the predecessor-in-interest of the Spouses Coja, was a co-owner of the subject 120-square meter property; and considering further that partition of the property is wanting, this Court is precluded from directing the Spouses Coja to return specific portions of the property to respondents.  Noteworthy is the pronouncement on this issue in De Guia v. Court of Appeals[39] citing Hermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso v. Nestoria de la Cruz and Herminio de la Cruz:[40]
2007-01-23
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Time and again, we have held that this Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to examine and evaluate the probative value of the evidence presented before the concerned tribunal upon which its impugned decision or resolution is based.[3] In an appeal to this Court by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be raised.[4]
2004-10-20
TINGA, J,
In arriving at the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the RTC. Among them: that it was Añonuevo's vehicle which had struck Villagracia;[10] that Añonuevo's vehicle had actually hit Villagracia's left mid-thigh, thus causing a comminuted fracture;[11] that as testified by eyewitness Alfredo Sorsano, witness for Villagracia, Añonuevo was "umaarangkada," or speeding as he made the left turn into Libertad;[12] that considering Añonuevo's claim that a passenger jeepney was obstructing his path as he made the turn. Añonuevo had enough warning to control his speed;[13] and that Añonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary precaution, care and diligence required of him in order that the accident could have been avoided.[14] Notably, Añonuevo, in his current petition, does not dispute the findings of tortious conduct on his part made by the lower courts, hinging his appeal instead on the alleged negligence of Villagracia. Añonuevo proffers no exculpatory version of facts on his part, nor does he dispute the conclusions made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the Court, which is not a trier of facts,[15] is not compelled to review the factual findings of the lower courts, which following jurisprudence have to be received with respect and are in fact generally binding.[16]
2003-10-03
TINGA, J.
The resolution of the issues presented before this Court by Naguiat involves the determination of facts, a function which this Court does not exercise in an appeal by certiorari. Under Rule 45 which governs appeal by certiorari, only questions of law may be raised[12] as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.[13] The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact generally binding on the Supreme Court.[14] A question of law which the Court may pass upon must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.[15] There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.[16]