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SPS. EDUARDO ARENAS DOMINGO AND JOSEFINA CHAVEZ DOMINGO v. LILIA MONTINOLA ROCES

This case has been cited 3 times or more.

2015-12-09
BERSAMIN, J.
Section 39 of Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act) requires that every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate. An encumbrance in the context of the provision is "anything that impairs the use or transfer of property; anything which constitutes a burden on the title; a burden or charge upon property; a claim or lien upon property."[44] It denotes "any right to, or interest in, land which may subsist in another to the diminution of its value, but consistent with the passing of the fee by conveyance."[45] An annotation, on the other hand, is "a remark, note, case summary, or commentary on some passage of a book, statutory provision, court decision, of the like, intended to illustrate or explain its meaning."[46] The purpose of the annotation is to charge the purchaser or title holder with notice of such burden and claims.[47] Being aware of the annotation, the purchaser must face the possibility that the title or the real property could be subject to the rights of third parties.[48]
2009-10-16
BRION, J.
Similarly, in Sps. Domingo v. Roces,[16] we said: The foregoing rule clearly covers transfers of real property to any person, as long as the deprived heir or creditor vindicates his rights within two years from the date of the settlement and distribution of estate. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the effects of this provision are not limited to the heirs or original distributees of the estate properties, but shall affect any transferee of the properties. [Emphasis supplied.]
2004-02-05
CARPIO, J.
In the case of Santiago Land Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 106194, 276 SCRA 674 [1997]), petitioner maintained that as a purchaser pendente lite of the land in litigation, it had a right to intervene under Rule 12, Section 2. We rejected this position and said that "since petitioner is not a stranger to the action between Quisumbing and the PNB, petitioner in fact having stepped into the shoes of PNB in a manner of speaking, it follows that it cannot claim any further right to intervene in the action." As in the instant Petition, it was argued that the denial of the Motion to Intervene would be a denial likewise of due process. But this, too, was struck down in Santiago Land where we held that "petitioner is not really denied protection. It is represented in the action by its predecessor in interest." Indeed, since petitioner is a transferee pendente lite with notice of the pending litigation between Reyes and private respondent Carreon, petitioner stands exactly in the shoes of Reyes and is bound by any judgment or decree which may be rendered for or against the latter. Indeed, one who buys property with full knowledge of the flaws and defects of the title of his vendor and of a pending litigation over the property gambles on the result of the litigation and is bound by the outcome of his indifference.[21] A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on guard and then claim that he acted in good faith believing that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.[22]