Lawyerly

GR No. 212623

2016-01-11

MENDOZA, J.

Unless there is concrete proof that a judge has a personal interest in the proceedings and that his bias stems from an extra-judicial source, this Court shall always presume that a magistrate shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts.[33] Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judge's sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice with impartiality. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough.[34]

GR No. 180284

2013-09-11

NARCISO SALAS v. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right to assume that their motions would be granted. Thus, they must be prepared on the day of the hearing.[19] Indeed, an order declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the trial court's duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party.[20]

GR No. 171137

2009-06-05

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. SPS. WILSON DY HONG PI AND LOLITA DY AND SPS. PRIMO CHUYACO

PUNO, J.

Paragraph two of the same provision meanwhile provides for the rule on voluntary inhibition and states: "[a] judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above." That discretion is a matter of conscience and is addressed primarily to the judge's sense of fairness and justice.[57] We have elucidated on this point in Pimentel v. Salanga,[58] as follows:A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act in or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decision to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substances to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice. The present case not being covered by the rule on mandatory inhibition, the issue thus turns on whether Judge Napoleon Inoturan should have voluntarily inhibited himself.

GR No. 158941

2008-02-11

TIMESHARE REALTY CORPORATION v. CESAR LAO and CYNTHIA V. CORTEZ

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Its motion for extension being inherently flawed, petitioner should not have presumed that the CA would fully grant the same.[28] Instead, it should have exercised due diligence by filing the proper petition within the allowable period,[29] or at the very least, ascertaining from the CA whether its motion for extension had been acted upon.[30] As it were, petitioner's counsel left the country, unmindful of the possibility that his client's period to appeal was about to lapse - as it indeed lapsed on July 25, 1999, after the CA allowed them a 15-day extension only, in view of the restriction under Section 4, Rule 43. Thus, petitioner has only itself to blame that the Petition for Review it filed on August 19, 1999 was late by 25 days. The CA cannot be faulted for dismissing it.

GR Nos. 154150-51

2007-12-10

NIDA ALEJO v. JUDGE ERLINDA PESTAÑO-BUTED

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. In People v. Kho,[4] this Court held that the foregoing Rule contemplates two kinds of inhibitions compulsory and voluntary. The first paragraph provides that compulsory disqualification conclusively presumes that the judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case. The second paragraph, in turn, leaves to the judge's discretion whether he should desist from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons. A judge, however, does not enjoy a wide latitude in the exercise of his discretion to inhibit himself from hearing a case, as the inhibition must be for just and valid causes.[5]

GR NO. 167471

2007-02-05

GLICERIA SARMIENTO v. EMERITA ZARATAN

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias and partiality is not enough ground for judges to inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias and partiality.[31] This Court has invariably held that for bias and prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough. Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice "in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear and favor."[32]

GR NO. 152202

2006-07-28

CRISOSTOMO ALCARAZ v. CA

PUNO, J.

A charge of arbitrariness and bias against the trial court, in this case against the judge as well as all the court personnel, is a serious charge that must be substantiated. Bare allegations of partiality will not suffice. It must be shown that the trial court committed acts or engaged in conduct clearly indicative of bias or pre-judgment against a party. The petitioner failed to do so in this case. The disallowance of a motion for postponement is not sufficient to show arbitrariness and partiality of the trial court. As this Court ruled in the case of Gochan v. Gochan,[18] to wit:. . . . A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right to assume that their motions would be granted. Thus, they must be prepared on the day of the hearing.

GR NO. 148150

2006-07-12

R TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. PHILHINO SALES CORPORATION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Moreover, the grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right.[26] It is addressed to the sound discretion of the courts. Parties asking for postponement have no right to assume that their motions would be granted nor to expect that their motion for reconsideration of their denied motion for postponement would be reconsidered.[27] Thus, they must be prepared on the day of the hearing.[28] Action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts, in the absence of clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice.[29] In other words, this Court cannot make a finding of grave abuse of discretion simply because a court decides to proceed with the trial of a case rather than postpone the hearing to another day because of the absence of a party or a party's witness.[30] To constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the refusal of the court to postpone the hearing must be characterized by arbitrariness or capriciousness which is totally absent in the case under consideration.

GR NO. 165606

2006-02-06

DEUTSCHE BANK MANILA v. SPS. CHUA YOK SEE AND REBECCA SEE

CALLEJO, SR., J.

Petitioner's contention that the trial court showed bias and prejudgment of the case is likewise without merit. To disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice, the movant must prove the same with clear and convincing evidence.[46] Bare allegations of partiality will not suffice. It cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice fairly and equitably.[47]

GR NO. 160966

2005-10-11

PAGODA PHILIPPINES v. UNIVERSAL CANNING

PANGANIBAN, J.

The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under the first paragraph of the cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned. The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.[11]

	GR No. 212623 2016-01-11	ENRIQUE G. DE LEON v. PEOPLE MENDOZA, J.
Unless there is concrete proof that a judge has a personal interest in the proceedings and that his bias stems from an extra-judicial source, this Court shall always presume that a magistrate shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts.[33] Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judge's sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice with impartiality. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough.[34]
	GR No. 180284 2013-09-11	NARCISO SALAS v. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM VILLARAMA, JR., J.
A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right to assume that their motions would be granted. Thus, they must be prepared on the day of the hearing.[19] Indeed, an order declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the trial court's duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party.[20]
	GR No. 171137 2009-06-05	PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. SPS. WILSON DY HONG PI AND LOLITA DY AND SPS. PRIMO CHUYACO PUNO, J.
Paragraph two of the same provision meanwhile provides for the rule on voluntary inhibition and states: "[a] judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above." That discretion is a matter of conscience and is addressed primarily to the judge's sense of fairness and justice.[57] We have elucidated on this point in Pimentel v. Salanga,[58] as follows:A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act in or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decision to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substances to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice. The present case not being covered by the rule on mandatory inhibition, the issue thus turns on whether Judge Napoleon Inoturan should have voluntarily inhibited himself.
	GR No. 158941 2008-02-11	TIMESHARE REALTY CORPORATION v. CESAR LAO and CYNTHIA V. CORTEZ AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Its motion for extension being inherently flawed, petitioner should not have presumed that the CA would fully grant the same.[28] Instead, it should have exercised due diligence by filing the proper petition within the allowable period,[29] or at the very least, ascertaining from the CA whether its motion for extension had been acted upon.[30] As it were, petitioner's counsel left the country, unmindful of the possibility that his client's period to appeal was about to lapse - as it indeed lapsed on July 25, 1999, after the CA allowed them a 15-day extension only, in view of the restriction under Section 4, Rule 43. Thus, petitioner has only itself to blame that the Petition for Review it filed on August 19, 1999 was late by 25 days. The CA cannot be faulted for dismissing it.
	GR Nos. 154150-51 2007-12-10	NIDA ALEJO v. JUDGE ERLINDA PESTAÑO-BUTED SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. In People v. Kho,[4] this Court held that the foregoing Rule contemplates two kinds of inhibitions compulsory and voluntary. The first paragraph provides that compulsory disqualification conclusively presumes that the judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case. The second paragraph, in turn, leaves to the judge's discretion whether he should desist from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons. A judge, however, does not enjoy a wide latitude in the exercise of his discretion to inhibit himself from hearing a case, as the inhibition must be for just and valid causes.[5]
	GR NO. 167471 2007-02-05	GLICERIA SARMIENTO v. EMERITA ZARATAN CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias and partiality is not enough ground for judges to inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias and partiality.[31] This Court has invariably held that for bias and prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough. Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice "in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear and favor."[32]
	GR NO. 152202 2006-07-28	CRISOSTOMO ALCARAZ v. CA PUNO, J.
A charge of arbitrariness and bias against the trial court, in this case against the judge as well as all the court personnel, is a serious charge that must be substantiated. Bare allegations of partiality will not suffice. It must be shown that the trial court committed acts or engaged in conduct clearly indicative of bias or pre-judgment against a party. The petitioner failed to do so in this case. The disallowance of a motion for postponement is not sufficient to show arbitrariness and partiality of the trial court. As this Court ruled in the case of Gochan v. Gochan,[18] to wit:. . . . A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right to assume that their motions would be granted. Thus, they must be prepared on the day of the hearing.
	GR NO. 148150 2006-07-12	R TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. PHILHINO SALES CORPORATION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Moreover, the grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right.[26] It is addressed to the sound discretion of the courts. Parties asking for postponement have no right to assume that their motions would be granted nor to expect that their motion for reconsideration of their denied motion for postponement would be reconsidered.[27] Thus, they must be prepared on the day of the hearing.[28] Action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts, in the absence of clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice.[29] In other words, this Court cannot make a finding of grave abuse of discretion simply because a court decides to proceed with the trial of a case rather than postpone the hearing to another day because of the absence of a party or a party's witness.[30] To constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the refusal of the court to postpone the hearing must be characterized by arbitrariness or capriciousness which is totally absent in the case under consideration.
	GR NO. 165606 2006-02-06	DEUTSCHE BANK MANILA v. SPS. CHUA YOK SEE AND REBECCA SEE CALLEJO, SR., J.
Petitioner's contention that the trial court showed bias and prejudgment of the case is likewise without merit. To disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice, the movant must prove the same with clear and convincing evidence.[46] Bare allegations of partiality will not suffice. It cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice fairly and equitably.[47]
	GR NO. 160966 2005-10-11	PAGODA PHILIPPINES v. UNIVERSAL CANNING PANGANIBAN, J.
The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under the first paragraph of the cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned. The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.[11]

MERCEDES R. GOCHAN v. VIRGINIA GOCHAN