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PEOPLE v. FELY MERCADO

This case has been cited 8 times or more.

	GR No. 199270 2015-10-21	PEOPLE v. VERGEL ANCAJAS PERALTA, J.
Hence, the imposable penalty must be reduced by one degree, i.e., from reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.[63] To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, reclusion temporal should be reduced by one degree, prision mayor, which has a range of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be imposed in its medium period. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from the full range of prision mayor.[64]
	GR No. 214865 2015-08-19	ROSVEE C. CELESTIAL v. PEOPLE VELASCO JR., J.
In ascertaining the proper penalty, We are guided by Our pronouncement in People v. Mercado:[22]
	GR No. 193507 2013-01-30	PEOPLE v. REY MONTICALVO Y MAGNO PEREZ, J.
Applying the privileged mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty upon appellant is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua - the penalty prescribed by law for simple rape. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.[70]
	GR No. 176298 2012-01-25	ANITA L. MIRANDA v. PEOPLE VILLARAMA, JR., J.
However, notwithstanding the correctness of the finding of petitioner's guilt, a modification is called for as regards the imposable penalty. On the imposition of the correct penalty, People v. Mercado[17] is instructive. Pursuant to said case, in the determination of the penalty for qualified theft, note is taken of the value of the property stolen, which is P797,187.85 in this case. Since the value exceeds P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in the maximum period, that is, eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor.
	GR No. 193479 2011-10-19	PEOPLE v. BERNARD G. MIRTO VELASCO JR., J.
Sixth. That accused-appellant committed the crime with grave abuse of confidence is clear. As gathered from the nature of his position, accused-appellant was a credit and collection officer of UCC in the Cagayan-Isabela area. His position entailed a high degree of confidence, having access to funds collected from UCC clients. In People v. Sison,[22] involving a Branch Operation Officer of Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB), the Court upheld the appellant's conviction of Qualified Theft, holding that "the management of the PCIB reposed its trust and confidence in the appellant as its Luneta Branch Operation Officer, and it was this trust and confidence which he exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of PCIB x x x."[23] In People v. Mercado,[24] involving a manager of a jewelry store, the Court likewise affirmed the appellant's conviction of Qualified Theft through grave abuse of confidence.
	GR No. 156009 2009-06-05	ROMMEL C. BRIONES v. PEOPLE BRION, J.
Additionally, an error or mistake committed by a counsel in the course of judicial proceedings is not a ground for new trial. In People v. Mercado,[24] we declared:It has been repeatedly enunciated that "a client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different if he proceeded differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who would allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. x x x Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof, x x x failure to introduce certain evidence, to summon witnesses, and to argue the case are not proper grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetency of counsel is so great that his client is prejudiced and prevented from properly presenting his case. [Emphasis supplied][25]
	GR NO. 159734 2006-11-30	ROSARIO V. ASTUDILLO v. PEOPLE CARPIO MORALES, J.
On the imposition of the correct penalty, People v. Mercado[61] is instructive. In the determination of the penalty for Qualified Theft, note is taken of the value of the property stolen, which is P797,984.00. Since the value exceeds P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in the maximum period Eight (8) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day to Ten (10) Years of prision mayor.
	GR NO. 149200 2006-07-14	ABRAHAM ONG v. CIBA GEIGY CORONA, J.
The general rule is that the client is bound by the actuation of his counsel in the conduct of the case and cannot be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had his counsel proceeded differently. In criminal cases, as well as in civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact that blunders and mistakes may have been made in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel does not constitute a ground for new trial.[9] The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.[10]