This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2011-11-23 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely: (a) that the means, methods and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) that such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person.[28] | |||||
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2004-04-14 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| For failure of the prosecution to prove treachery or any other circumstance which would qualify the killing to murder, appellant should only be held liable for the crime of homicide.[36] Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide. Considering that there was neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the penalty has to be imposed in the medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant should therefore be sentenced to suffer the penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.[37] | |||||
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2004-03-25 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Noteworthy, after the stabbing incident, appellant took flight. A warrant of arrest against the appellant was issued on January 3, 1995. But it was only on April 11, 1999, that the appellant was taken into custody by the police. For five years, appellant disappeared from view, until the long arm of the law caught up with him. As previously held, the flight of the accused, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be established "for a truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and to assert his innocence."[34] Flight evidences guilt and guilty conscience: the wicked flee, even when no man pursues, but the righteous stand fast as bold as a lion.[35] | |||||
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2004-02-18 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| The trial court did not err in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance.[22] In People v. Viernes,[23] we held that going to the police station to clear one's name does not show any intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities. | |||||
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2003-10-24 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| If any nagging doubts as to appellants' guilt still linger, their leaving hastily the scene of the crime as the victim was shouting "Rape!"[34] should dissipate them. Thus, by Nestor Igot's account, after a group of cyclists and joggers had gathered around the victim, appellants, on board the vehicle, immediately headed towards the direction of Cebu City.[35] Innocent persons would normally seize the first available opportunity to defend themselves and assert their innocence.[36] Appellants' flight certainly strongly indicates their guilt.[37] | |||||
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2003-09-12 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| We come now to the fifth issue: whether or not the trial court erred in refusing to consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the appellants. The answer is in the negative. To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary.[64] A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. The jeep in which the appellants were riding was flagged down by SPO4 de la Cruz.[65] The fact alone that they did not resist but went peacefully although reluctantly with the police officer does not mean that they voluntarily surrendered.[66] | |||||