Lawyerly

GR No. 187677

2013-04-17

SERENO, C.J.

Expropriation, or the exercise of the State's right to eminent domain, is proscribed by the restraints of public use and just compensation.[26] It is governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which presents procedural guidelines for the court to ensure that due process is observed and just compensation rightly paid to the private owners.

GR No. 164195

2010-10-12

APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES

BRION, J.

We subsequently upheld Republic's 12% per annum interest rate on the unpaid expropriation compensation in the following cases: Reyes v. National Housing Authority,[19] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,[20] Republic v. Court of Appeals,[21] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial,[22] Philippine Ports Authority v. Rosales-Bondoc,[23] and Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority.[24]

GR Nos. 154211-12

2009-06-22

SPS. ERNESTO F. CURATA AND LOURDES M. CURATA v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY

VELASCO JR., J.

The PPA is hereby DIRECTED to pay with dispatch the lot owners who are parties to these consolidated petitions the just compensation for their respective lots at the unit price of PhP 425 per square meter, with 12% interest per annum from the date of PPA's entry to the lots or on September 11, 2001 until fully paid,[162] less whatever initial payments they have already received. In case of overpayment, the affected lot owners shall refund the excess to PPA.

GR No. 124795

2008-12-10

FORFOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State. Being inherent, the power need not be specifically conferred on the government by the Constitution.[36] Section 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.[37]

GR No. 169914

2008-04-18

ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

To be valid, the taking must be for public use. The meaning of the term "public use" has evolved over time in response to changing public needs and exigencies. Public use which was traditionally understood as strictly limited to actual "use by the public" has already been abandoned.[128] "Public use" has `now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare" and "public convenience."[129] It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.[130] Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.[131]

GR NO. 150640

2007-03-22

BARANGAY SINDALAN v. CA

Another vital requisite for a valid condemnation is the payment of just compensation to the property owner. In the recent case of APO Fruits Corporation v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,[18] just compensation has been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator," and that the gauge for computation is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. In order for the payment to be "just," it must be real, substantial, full, and ample. Not only must the payment be fair and correctly determined, but also, the Court in Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone stressed that the payment should be made within a "reasonable time" from the taking of the property.[19] It succinctly explained that without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of the land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss. Thus, once just compensation is finally determined, the expropriator must immediately pay the amount to the lot owner. In Reyes v. National Housing Authority, it was ruled that 12% interest per annum shall be imposed on the final compensation until paid.[20] Thus, any further delay in the payment will result in the imposition of 12% interest per annum. However, in the recent case of Republic v. Lim, the Court enunciated the rule that "where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property."[21]

GR NO. 158563

2006-06-30

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In this case, the judgment on the propriety of the taking and the adequacy of the compensation received have long become final. We have also already held that the terms of that judgment granted title in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. Therefore, pursuant to our ruling in Fery, as recently cited in Reyes v. National Housing Authority,[38] no rights to Lot No. 72, either express or implied, have been retained by the herein respondent.

GR NO. 166429

2005-12-19

REPUBLIC v. HENRICK F. GINGOYON

TINGA, J.

(T)he right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but (the) title does not pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him.[109] (emphasis supplied) True, title remains with the owner until just compensation is fully paid. This is only proper to protect the rights of the property owner. But that is not the point here. The issue is whether or not the expropriating authority has the right to enter and use the property even prior to full payment.[110] In other words, can the property be taken and used even before full payment of just compensation? Yes. Full payment of just compensation, though a condition precedent for the transfer of title or ownership, is not a condition precedent for the taking of the property. As discussed earlier, an important element of taking is that the owner's right to possess and exploit the land (in other words, his beneficial ownership of it) is transferred to and thenceforth exercised by the expropriator.

GR NO. 148574

2005-10-11

EUGENIO G. PALILEO v. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over private properties upon payment of just compensation.[20] In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court characterized the power of eminent domain in this wise:The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it.

GR NO. 156273

2005-08-09

HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO v. MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY

CALLEJO, SR., J.

Respondent MCIAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration[27] dated November 10, 2003 praying that the Court's decision be reconsidered and set aside. In the said motion, the respondent reiterated its earlier claim that: (a) the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881, which granted to MCIAA the titles to Lot Nos. 916 and 920 in fee simple, has long become final and executory; (b) this Court's October 15, 2003 Decision, granting the petitioners' right of repurchase, effectively overturns the rulings in Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan,[28] MCIAA v. Court of Appeals,[29] and Reyes v. National Housing Authority;[30] (c) the petitioners are not entitled to reconveyance or repurchase of the questioned lots after the closure of the Lahug Airport; (d) Lot Nos. 916 and 920, which were expropriated in Civil Case No. R-1881, should not be treated like those lots sold through negotiated sale with a stipulation for reconveyance or repurchase; and (e) granting arguendo that petitioners have a right to repurchase Lot Nos. 916 and 920, the repurchase price should be the fair market value of the lands.

GR No. 158563

2005-06-30

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

ruling in Fery, as recently cited in Reyes v. National Housing Authority,[38] no rights to Lot No. 72, either express or implied, have been retained by the herein respondent. We are not unaware of the ruling in Heirs of Timoteo Moreno v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority,[39] concerning still another set of owners of lots declared expropriated in the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881. As with Chiongbian and

GR NO. 161656

2005-06-29

REPUBLIC v. VICENTE G. LIM

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not entitled to recover possession of Lot 932 but only to demand payment of its fair market value. Of course, we are aware of the doctrine that "non-payment of just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots." This is our ruling in the recent cases of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[17] and Reyes vs. National Housing Authority.[18] However, the facts of the present case do not justify its application. It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the Republic's failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In several jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery of possession may be had when property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one claiming to act under the power of eminent domain[19] or where a rightful entry is made and the party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been assessed or agreed upon;[20] or fails or refuses to have the compensation assessed and paid.[21]

GR NO. 159647

2005-04-15

CIR v. CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION

PANGANIBAN, J.

The concept of public use is no longer confined to the traditional notion of use by the public, but held synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public convenience.[78] The discount privilege to which our senior citizens are entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the general public to which these citizens belong. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments concerned, were it not for RA 7432. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit.

GR NO. 147245

2005-03-31

REPUBLIC v. CA

CARPIO, J.

Respondent is thus entitled to just compensation for the 22,073 square meter Canal Sites at P1.39 per square meter, with legal interest from the time of the taking of the Canal Sites in 1972 until the amount due is fully paid. In line with current jurisprudence,[47] we set the legal interest at 12% per annum in order to eliminate the usual issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of currency over time.

GR No. 140160

2004-01-13

LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. FELICIANO F. WYCOCO

YNARES-SATIAGO, J.

In some expropriation cases, the Court imposed an interest of 12% per annum on the just compensation due the landowner. It must be stressed, however, that in these cases, the imposition of interest was in the nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance.[38] It follows that the interest in the form of damages cannot be applied where there was prompt and valid payment of just compensation. Conversely, where there was delay in tendering a valid payment of just compensation, imposition of interest is in order. This is because the replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination of this compensation was marred by lack of due process.[39]

GR No. 156273

2003-10-15

HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO v. MACTAN - CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY

BELLOSILLO, J.

In resolving this dispute, we must reckon with the rulings of this Court in Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan and Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, which define the rights and obligations of landowners whose properties were expropriated when the public purpose for which eminent domain was exercised no longer subsists. In Fery, which was cited in the recent case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[27] we declared that the government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties -

	GR No. 187677 2013-04-17	REPUBLIC v. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD SERENO, C.J.
Expropriation, or the exercise of the State's right to eminent domain, is proscribed by the restraints of public use and just compensation.[26] It is governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which presents procedural guidelines for the court to ensure that due process is observed and just compensation rightly paid to the private owners.
	GR No. 164195 2010-10-12	APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES BRION, J.
We subsequently upheld Republic's 12% per annum interest rate on the unpaid expropriation compensation in the following cases: Reyes v. National Housing Authority,[19] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,[20] Republic v. Court of Appeals,[21] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial,[22] Philippine Ports Authority v. Rosales-Bondoc,[23] and Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority.[24]
	GR Nos. 154211-12 2009-06-22	SPS. ERNESTO F. CURATA AND LOURDES M. CURATA v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VELASCO JR., J.
The PPA is hereby DIRECTED to pay with dispatch the lot owners who are parties to these consolidated petitions the just compensation for their respective lots at the unit price of PhP 425 per square meter, with 12% interest per annum from the date of PPA's entry to the lots or on September 11, 2001 until fully paid,[162] less whatever initial payments they have already received. In case of overpayment, the affected lot owners shall refund the excess to PPA.
	GR No. 124795 2008-12-10	FORFOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State. Being inherent, the power need not be specifically conferred on the government by the Constitution.[36] Section 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.[37]
	GR No. 169914 2008-04-18	ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
To be valid, the taking must be for public use. The meaning of the term "public use" has evolved over time in response to changing public needs and exigencies. Public use which was traditionally understood as strictly limited to actual "use by the public" has already been abandoned.[128] "Public use" has `now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare" and "public convenience."[129] It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.[130] Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.[131]
	GR NO. 150640 2007-03-22	BARANGAY SINDALAN v. CA
Another vital requisite for a valid condemnation is the payment of just compensation to the property owner. In the recent case of APO Fruits Corporation v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,[18] just compensation has been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator," and that the gauge for computation is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. In order for the payment to be "just," it must be real, substantial, full, and ample. Not only must the payment be fair and correctly determined, but also, the Court in Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone stressed that the payment should be made within a "reasonable time" from the taking of the property.[19] It succinctly explained that without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of the land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss. Thus, once just compensation is finally determined, the expropriator must immediately pay the amount to the lot owner. In Reyes v. National Housing Authority, it was ruled that 12% interest per annum shall be imposed on the final compensation until paid.[20] Thus, any further delay in the payment will result in the imposition of 12% interest per annum. However, in the recent case of Republic v. Lim, the Court enunciated the rule that "where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property."[21]
	GR NO. 158563 2006-06-30	AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In this case, the judgment on the propriety of the taking and the adequacy of the compensation received have long become final. We have also already held that the terms of that judgment granted title in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. Therefore, pursuant to our ruling in Fery, as recently cited in Reyes v. National Housing Authority,[38] no rights to Lot No. 72, either express or implied, have been retained by the herein respondent.
	GR NO. 166429 2005-12-19	REPUBLIC v. HENRICK F. GINGOYON TINGA, J.
(T)he right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but (the) title does not pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him.[109] (emphasis supplied) True, title remains with the owner until just compensation is fully paid. This is only proper to protect the rights of the property owner. But that is not the point here. The issue is whether or not the expropriating authority has the right to enter and use the property even prior to full payment.[110] In other words, can the property be taken and used even before full payment of just compensation? Yes. Full payment of just compensation, though a condition precedent for the transfer of title or ownership, is not a condition precedent for the taking of the property. As discussed earlier, an important element of taking is that the owner's right to possess and exploit the land (in other words, his beneficial ownership of it) is transferred to and thenceforth exercised by the expropriator.
	GR NO. 148574 2005-10-11	EUGENIO G. PALILEO v. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over private properties upon payment of just compensation.[20] In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court characterized the power of eminent domain in this wise:The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it.
	GR NO. 156273 2005-08-09	HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO v. MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY CALLEJO, SR., J.
Respondent MCIAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration[27] dated November 10, 2003 praying that the Court's decision be reconsidered and set aside. In the said motion, the respondent reiterated its earlier claim that: (a) the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881, which granted to MCIAA the titles to Lot Nos. 916 and 920 in fee simple, has long become final and executory; (b) this Court's October 15, 2003 Decision, granting the petitioners' right of repurchase, effectively overturns the rulings in Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan,[28] MCIAA v. Court of Appeals,[29] and Reyes v. National Housing Authority;[30] (c) the petitioners are not entitled to reconveyance or repurchase of the questioned lots after the closure of the Lahug Airport; (d) Lot Nos. 916 and 920, which were expropriated in Civil Case No. R-1881, should not be treated like those lots sold through negotiated sale with a stipulation for reconveyance or repurchase; and (e) granting arguendo that petitioners have a right to repurchase Lot Nos. 916 and 920, the repurchase price should be the fair market value of the lands.
	GR No. 158563 2005-06-30	AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
ruling in Fery, as recently cited in Reyes v. National Housing Authority,[38] no rights to Lot No. 72, either express or implied, have been retained by the herein respondent. We are not unaware of the ruling in Heirs of Timoteo Moreno v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority,[39] concerning still another set of owners of lots declared expropriated in the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881. As with Chiongbian and
	GR NO. 161656 2005-06-29	REPUBLIC v. VICENTE G. LIM SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not entitled to recover possession of Lot 932 but only to demand payment of its fair market value. Of course, we are aware of the doctrine that "non-payment of just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots." This is our ruling in the recent cases of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[17] and Reyes vs. National Housing Authority.[18] However, the facts of the present case do not justify its application. It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the Republic's failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In several jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery of possession may be had when property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one claiming to act under the power of eminent domain[19] or where a rightful entry is made and the party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been assessed or agreed upon;[20] or fails or refuses to have the compensation assessed and paid.[21]
	GR NO. 159647 2005-04-15	CIR v. CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION PANGANIBAN, J.
The concept of public use is no longer confined to the traditional notion of use by the public, but held synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public convenience.[78] The discount privilege to which our senior citizens are entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the general public to which these citizens belong. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments concerned, were it not for RA 7432. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit.
	GR NO. 147245 2005-03-31	REPUBLIC v. CA CARPIO, J.
Respondent is thus entitled to just compensation for the 22,073 square meter Canal Sites at P1.39 per square meter, with legal interest from the time of the taking of the Canal Sites in 1972 until the amount due is fully paid. In line with current jurisprudence,[47] we set the legal interest at 12% per annum in order to eliminate the usual issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of currency over time.
	GR No. 140160 2004-01-13	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. FELICIANO F. WYCOCO YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
In some expropriation cases, the Court imposed an interest of 12% per annum on the just compensation due the landowner. It must be stressed, however, that in these cases, the imposition of interest was in the nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance.[38] It follows that the interest in the form of damages cannot be applied where there was prompt and valid payment of just compensation. Conversely, where there was delay in tendering a valid payment of just compensation, imposition of interest is in order. This is because the replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination of this compensation was marred by lack of due process.[39]
	GR No. 156273 2003-10-15	HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO v. MACTAN - CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY BELLOSILLO, J.
In resolving this dispute, we must reckon with the rulings of this Court in Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan and Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, which define the rights and obligations of landowners whose properties were expropriated when the public purpose for which eminent domain was exercised no longer subsists. In Fery, which was cited in the recent case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[27] we declared that the government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties -

MARINA Z. REYES v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY