This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-08-17 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Further, any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[41] However, the rule against warrantless searches and seizures admits of exceptions, such as the search of moving vehicles. In People v. Libnao,[42] the Court held: Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains a[n] item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.[43] | |||||
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2015-02-09 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In cases involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, "credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses, especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over [appellant's] self-serving and uncorroborated denial."[10] Appellant therefore had the burden to overcome the presumption that the police officers regularly and properly discharged their duties[11] which she failed to do. Against the evidence of the prosecution, her defenses of alibi, denial and frame-up crumble. Aside from being weak and uncorroborated, such defenses are viewed with disfavor since they can easily be concocted and are common and standard ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[12] | |||||
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2013-12-11 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Accused-appellant's claim that AAA was not in XXX at the time the rape took place as she was studying in ZZZ deserves little credit. Two certifications dated February 4, 2007 and February 5, 2007 issued by AAA's teachers reveal that AAA had transferred to XXX Elementary School in January 2001, where she attended the third and fourth grading periods and took the periodical tests for the same school periods. While these two certifications were not formally offered in evidence, they can still be considered by the Court as long as they had been properly identified by a witness' duly recorded testimony and the documents themselves had been incorporated in the records of the case.[12] The two certifications herein of AAA's teachers were duly identified by AAA when she testified before the RTC and subsequently incorporated as part of the records.[13] Accused-appellant's counsel even cross-examined AAA regarding these certifications and, in fact, the defense marked the same as its own exhibits, although the defense did not include said certifications in its formal offer of evidence for the obvious reason that said documents were not favorable to its case. | |||||
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2011-06-01 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Along with the charges against her, supported by the proof of the prosecution, all that appellant could offer was the defense of bare denial. Time and again, this Court held that the defense of denial, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. To merit consideration, it has to be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, which appellant failed to do.[52] | |||||
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2007-03-28 |
TINGA, J. |
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| However, as borne out by the record, Varona repeated his findings in open court in the course of his testimony on cross-examination and even was asked on re-direct examination by respondents' counsel thereon.[47] | |||||
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2006-10-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| There exists a constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures,[22] which refers to the immunity of one's person from interference by the government, included in which is his residence, his papers and other possessions.[23] The Constitution, however, does not provide a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures, rather the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between persons and the police, there must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with the power to issue or refuse such search warrant.[24] Yet, the responsibilities of the magistrate do not end with the granting of the warrant, but extends to the custody of the articles seized. In exercising custody over these articles, the property rights of the owner should be balanced with the social need to preserve evidence, which will be used in the prosecution of a case. | |||||
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2003-07-31 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| We cannot discern any improper motive, and no such motive was ever imputed to them by appellants, as to why the police would fabricate evidence and falsely implicate them in such a serious offense. From all the attendant circumstances, it appears that these police officers were simply carrying out their mission to curb drug abuse. The absence of evidence as to the improper motive actuating the principal witnesses for the prosecution strongly sustains the conclusion that none existed, and consequently their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.[31] Moreover, the prosecution witnesses who are all law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the absence of proof to the contrary.[32] | |||||