This case has been cited 6 times or more.
|
2007-04-27 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
||||
| On the inconsistency of CCC's claim regarding the time of the commission of the rape, suffice it to state that the precise time of commission is not an essential element of the crime.[36] | |||||
|
2006-08-31 |
AZCUNA, J. |
||||
| The Court finds nothing incredible in Sally's behavior. She woke up with appellant poking a knife at the base of her neck. The act of holding a knife, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring her to submission. The victim's failure to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist does not negate the commission of rape.[18] As noted by the trial court: The fact that the accused did not shout or resist when her shorts and panty were removed because of fear (TSN, Oct. 21, 1999, p. 12) does not lessen complainant's credibility. To an innocent girl who was then barely thirteen (13) years old, the threat engendered in her a well-grounded fear that if she dared resist or frustrate the bestial desires of the accused, she and her family would be killed. Intimidation is addressed to the mind of the victim and is, therefore, subjective. It must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable and people react differently. In such a given situation, some may shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked into sensibility; while others may openly welcome the intrusion. (People v. Cabradilla, 133 SCRA 413 (1984)). The test for its sufficiency under Article 335 of the revised Penal Code is whether it produces a reasonable fear in the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, that which the latter threatened to do would happen to her, or those dear to her, in this case, her family. Where such degree of intimidation exists, and the victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. And even if some degree of resistance would nevertheless be futile, offering none at all cannot amount to consent to the sexual assault. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. (People v. Savellano, 57 SCRA 320 (1974)). Likewise, Sally's delay in reporting the incident to the authorities is understandable. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assault against their virtue because of the threats on their lives.[19] Failure, therefore, by the victim to file a complaint promptly to the proper authorities would not necessarily destroy the truth per se of the complaint nor would it impair the credibility of the complainant, particularly if such delay was satisfactorily explained.[20] As a matter of fact, delay in reporting a rape case due to threats is justified.[21] As the Court held in People v. Ballester:[22] Neither can appellant find refuge in complainant's failure to promptly report the sexual assault to her relatives. Long silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape has not always been construed as an indication of a false accusation. In fact this principle applies with greater force in this case where the offended party was barely twelve years old, and was therefore susceptible to intimidation and threats of physical harm. Not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different and varying degrees of behavioral responses is expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode. It is settled that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.[23] | |||||
|
2003-07-29 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| Q: Why? A: Because it was already dark there in their place, sir.[25] It bears stressing that Desiree, although already a teener at sixteen, had a mental age of a mere seven-year-old. Technically then, she was only a child who could easily be cowed with fear, particularly when threatened by a knife. In such a situation, Desiree, or any child for that matter, could not be expected to act like an adult. Furthermore, Desiree's failure to shout for help does not negate the fact that she was raped. We held in People v. Emilio[26] that the failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate the commission of rape. The workings of the human mind under emotional stress are unpredictable, such that people react differently to startling situations. | |||||
|
2003-07-17 |
CORONA, J. |
||||
| I am not unaware of incestuous rape cases where the father's moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter have been considered in affirming rape convictions.[30] The Court has explained thusly: This ascendancy or influence "necessarily flows from the father's parental authority, which the Constitution and the laws recognize, as well as from the children's duty to obey and observe reverence and respect towards their parents. Such reverence and respect are deeply ingrained in the minds of Filipino children and are recognized by law. Abuse of both by a father can subjugate his daughter's will, thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants."[31] A careful reading of these cases would show, nevertheless, that the records have not been not totally bereft of evidence of force, violence or intimidation exerted by the accused. Consistently, in these instances, indications are extant that the complainants have put up some physical struggle or been cowed into submission. Moral ascendancy, at best, merely reduces the degree or extent of proof ordinarily constitutive of actual force, threat or intimidation.[32] There must still be sufficient indication in evidence, whether by word or by action, that force, threat or intimidation has somehow been employed. | |||||
|
2003-07-17 |
CORONA, J. |
||||
| Appellant's obvious pretense cannot prevail over the testimony of private complainant which the trial court found to be "categorical, straightforward, detailed and consistent." When the offended party is a young and immature girl, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, not only because of their relative vulnerability but also because of the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if the matter about which they testified were not true.[7] More so when, as here, the private complainant was appellant's own daughter. Generally, no young woman will accuse her own father of so grave a crime as rape unless she has truly been aggrieved.[8] Besides, we note that private complainant could not hold back her emotions and cried profusely at a certain point during the trial.[9] It is a matter of judicial cognizance that the spontaneous crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence that speaks well of her credibility.[10] | |||||
|
2003-04-02 |
PER CURIAM |
||||
| We note that the variances in the complainant's testimony as to the time of the rape[26] are but minor inconsistencies. We have ruled on numerous occasions that minor inconsistencies in rape cases will not necessarily derail the testimony of the offended party, for rape victims cannot be expected to be precise in recounting the details of a clearly harrowing experience.[27] As long as the testimony is consistent on material points, slightly conflicting statements will not undermine the witness' credibility nor the veracity of the testimony.[28] Besides, specification of the exact time of the commission of rape is not important, as it is not an element of the crime.[29] | |||||