This case has been cited 21 times or more.
|
2014-03-12 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| To constitute abandonment of work, two elements must concur: "(1) x x x the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) x x x there must have been a clear intention [on the part of the employee] to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt act."[36] The employee's absence must be accompanied by overt acts that unerringly point to the employee's clear intention to sever the employment relationship.[37] And, to successfully invoke abandonment, whether as a ground for dismissing an employee or as a defense, the employer bears the burden of proving the employee's unjustified refusal to resume his employment.[38] Mere absence of the employee is not enough.[39] | |||||
|
2013-08-28 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| In a number of cases,[30] this Court consistently held that to constitute abandonment of work, two elements must be present: first, the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and second, there must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt act. | |||||
|
2013-06-19 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| Respondent explained that his absence from work was due to the fact that he and his counsel had asked and were waiting for a copy of result of the investigation on his alleged act of theft or dishonesty conducted on May 4, 2001 but were not given at all. We find his absence from work not sufficient to establish that he already had intention of abandoning his job. Besides, settled is the rule that mere absence or failure to report for work is not tantamount to abandonment of work.[35] Even the failure to report for work after a notice to return to work has been served does not necessarily constitute abandonment.[36] In fact, when respondent received petitioners' telegram on May 25, 2001 stating that "he was absent without official leave since May 5, 2001, and to notify CSI as soon as possible", he went to petitioners premises but was refused entry for reason that he was AWOL. He also tried to give them a letter dated May 26, 2001 from his counsel requesting for a copy of the resolution of the investigation conducted on May 4, 2001 but petitioners refused to receive the same which prompted respondent's counsel to send the letter dated May 26, 2001 to petitioners by registered mail on May 29, 2001. The fact of petitioners' refusal to receive the letter was stated in that letter but they never refuted the same which in effect, negates petitioners' claim that respondent did not comply with the telegram sent to him. | |||||
|
2012-02-22 |
SERENO, J. |
||||
| Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts, especially during times of hardship.[6] Thus, we have ruled in a series of cases that there are two elements that must concur in order for an act to constitute abandonment: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.[7] The second element is the more determinative factor, which must be manifested by some overt acts.[8] Mere absence or failure to report for work does not, ipso facto, amount to abandonment of work.[9] To prove abandonment, the employer must show that the employee deliberately and unjustifiably refused to resume his employment without any intention of returning.[10] | |||||
|
2011-11-28 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
||||
| In the case of Hodieng Concrete Products, Inc. v. Emilia[30], citing Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc.[31], the Court has ruled thus: "x x x. Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. And the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on the employer. | |||||
|
2011-11-16 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| Viewed in the light of the foregoing principles, we find that the CA correctly ruled out FI's position that Granfil had abandoned his employment. Aside from the fact that Bautista, Tenorio, Ballesteros and Dizon did not even execute sworn statements to refute the overt acts of dismissal imputed against them, the record is wholly bereft of any showing that FI required Granfil to report to its main office or, for that matter, to explain his supposed unauthorized absences. Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.[33] Even then, FI's theory of abandonment was likewise negated by Granfil's filing the complaint for illegal dismissal[34] which evinced his desire to return to work. In vigorously pursuing his action against FI before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA, Granfil clearly manifested that he has no intention of relinquishing his employment. In any case, the fact that Granfil prayed for his reinstatement speaks against any intent to sever the employer-employee relationship[35] with FI. | |||||
|
2011-03-02 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| Jurisprudence provides for two essential requirements for abandonment of work to exist. The "failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason" and "clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship x x x manifested by some overt acts" should both concur.[31] Further, the employee's deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume his employment without any intention of returning should be established and proven by the employer.[32] | |||||
|
2011-02-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| Besides, the fact that respondent filed the instant complaint negates any intention on his part to forsake his work. It is a settled doctrine that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the charge of abandonment, for an employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot by logic be said to have abandoned his work.[14] | |||||
|
2010-03-09 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| We sustain the CA's finding that respondents were dismissed from employment, and that such dismissal was without just cause. In a number of cases, we have ruled that an employer's claim that an employee was not dismissed but voluntarily left his employment is effectively belied by the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. It is settled, after all, that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the charge of abandonment, for an employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot, by logic, be said to have abandoned his work.[12] It then becomes imperative that the employer affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.[13] | |||||
|
2009-05-08 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| To constitute abandonment, there must be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the employer-employee relationship. Clearly, the operative act is still the employee's ultimate act of putting an end to his employment.[29] However, an employee who takes steps to protest her layoff cannot be said to have abandoned her work because a charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, more so when it includes a prayer for reinstatement.[30] When Eleonor filed the illegal dismissal complaint, it totally negated petitioner's theory of abandonment. | |||||
|
2009-03-13 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
||||
| Upon the other hand, petitioners' immediate filing of complaints for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal after the implementation of the questioned work scheme, which scheme was adopted soon after petitioners' complaints against respondent for violation of labor standards laws were found meritorious, negates respondent's claim of abandonment. An employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot by logic be said to have abandoned his work.[11] | |||||
|
2007-01-25 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| Prefatorily, we reiterate it is not the function of this Court to assess and evaluate the factual evidence presented before the lower courts. Its jurisdiction is generally limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the appellate court, unless, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are at variance with those of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. Since in this case they differ, we are compelled to review factual questions thus presented.[16] | |||||
|
2006-11-20 |
PUNO, J. |
||||
| Alongside the petitioner's contention that it was the respondent who quit her employment and refused to return to work, greater stock may be taken of the respondent's immediate filing of her complaint with the NLRC. Indeed, an employee who loses no time in protesting her layoff cannot by any reasoning be said to have abandoned her work, for it is well-settled that the filing of an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of her desire to return to work, thus, negating the employer's charge of abandonment.[45] | |||||
|
2006-09-12 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that for abandonment of work to exist, it is essential that (1) the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid and justifiable reason; and (2) there must have been an indisputable intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts, with the second element as the more determinative factor.[28] | |||||
|
2005-10-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| However, we are not convinced that in the present case, petitioners have shown sufficiently clear and convincing evidence to justify Galay's termination. Though they are correct in saying that in this case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, still there must be substantial evidence to support the termination on the ground of attitude.[19] The mere mention of negative feedback from her team members, and the letter dated February 23, 1999, are not proof of her attitude problem. Likewise, her failure to refute petitioners' allegations of her negative attitude does not amount to admission. Technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.[20] Besides, the burden of proof is not on the employee but on the employer who must affirmatively show adequate evidence that the dismissal was for justifiable cause.[21] | |||||
|
2005-08-14 |
AZCUNA, J. |
||||
| This contention has no merit. The substantive aspect for a valid dismissal provides that to constitute abandonment of work, two (2) requisites must concur: (a) the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without justifiable reason; and (b) there must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by overt acts. Abandonment as a just ground for dismissal requires deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Mere absence or failure to report for work, after notice to return, is not enough to amount to abandonment. Moreover, abandonment is a matter of intention; it cannot be inferred or presumed from equivocal acts.[6] In this case, respondents had sought permission and had informed petitioner of their reasons for being absent and had reported back to petitioner's office the following day. It cannot be said that respondents had abandoned their work during the period the absences in question were incurred. It became a strange scenario for them to be reporting for work early in the morning only to be told to wait for Ding who would arrive at noon time. In the meantime, they were not even allowed to enter the premises or do their assigned tasks. This being so, respondents sought recourse by filing an illegal dismissal case against petitioner. Clearly, respondents never intended to sever the employer-employee relation and abandon their work. On the contrary, they clearly showed their desire to continue their employment with petitioner and to be reinstated to their former positions. Indeed, an employee who loses no time in protesting his layoff cannot by any reasoning be said to have abandoned his work, for it is well-settled that the filing by an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus, negating the employer's charge of abandonment.[7] | |||||
|
2005-07-14 |
AZCUNA, J. |
||||
| presumed from equivocal acts.[6] In this case, respondents had sought permission and had informed petitioner of their reasons for being absent and had reported back to petitioner's office the following day. It cannot be said that respondents had abandoned their work during the period the absences in question were incurred. It became a strange scenario for them to be reporting for work early in the morning only to be told to wait for Ding who would arrive at noon time. In the meantime, they were not even allowed to enter the premises or do their assigned tasks. This being so, respondents sought recourse by filing an illegal dismissal case against petitioner. Clearly, respondents never intended to sever the employer-employee relation and abandon their work. On the contrary, they clearly showed their desire to continue their employment with petitioner and to be reinstated to their former positions. Indeed, an employee who loses no time in protesting his layoff cannot by any reasoning be said to have abandoned his work, for it is well-settled that the filing by an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus, negating the employer's charge of abandonment.[7] | |||||
|
2005-06-27 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| Petitioner failed to adduce proof of overt acts of Oclarit showing his clear intention to abandon his work. On the contrary, Oclarit's filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal on the day of effectivity of his dismissal is proof of Oclarit's desire to return to work and negates the charge of abandonment of work.[24] | |||||
|
2004-03-30 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
||||
| In Samarca vs. Arc-Men Industries, Inc.,[5] we held that "for abandonment of work to exist, it is essential (1) that the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. Deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employee to go back to his work post and resume his employment must be established. Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. And the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on the employer." However, the above twin essential requirements for abandonment to exist are not present in the case at bar. | |||||
|
2003-10-23 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
||||
| Here, respondents did not report back for work because they were warned by petitioner Sasaki not to return. But immediately, they filed with the Labor Arbiter's Office a complaint for illegal dismissal. It is a settled doctrine that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the charge of abandonment, for an employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot by logic be said to have abandoned his work.[6] | |||||