This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2011-08-31 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[15] | |||||
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2009-09-03 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Exigent and emergency circumstances.[32] | |||||
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2008-11-19 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred and must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.[49] It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.[50] The burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given lies with the State.[51] Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed and courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.[52] To constitute a valid consent or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must be shown that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.[53] | |||||
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2007-11-23 |
TINGA, J, |
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| For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[21] Here, petitioner's act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached him. | |||||
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2007-11-23 |
TINGA, J, |
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| Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.[32] In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution albeit based on conflicting testimonies on when petitioner's bag was actually opened, it is apparent that petitioner was already under the coercive control of the public officials who had custody of him when the search of his bag was demanded. Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove any specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." Even granting that petitioner admitted to opening his bag when Ordoño asked to see its contents, his implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and hence, is considered no consent at all within the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee.[33] As a result, petitioner's lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.[34] | |||||
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2007-02-22 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Exigent and emergency circumstances.[36] | |||||
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2005-09-01 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Moreover, as far back as 1994 or more than ten years ago, in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,[23] the Court already made the pronouncement that "[i]f a change is desired in the practice [of the Bicameral Conference Committee] it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house." [24] To date, Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes adverted to by the Court. It seems, therefore, that Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference committee to be very useful for purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action. | |||||
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2004-07-29 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| In denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the Sandiganbayan passed upon the other grounds he had raised. It ruled that his right to a preliminary investigation was not violated, because he had been granted a reinvestigation.[9] It further held that his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was not trampled upon, either, inasmuch as the Information had set forth the essential elements of the offense charged.[10] | |||||