This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2007-01-23 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The Court of Appeals and the trial court accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of Adelaida who described with reasonable certainty the fact of the killing, as well as identified Pascual as the assailant. It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a witness and his testimony is accorded the highest respect because of the latter's untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and thus, to determine whether he is telling the truth.[19] | |||||
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2006-01-24 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| In contrast, appellant's alibi and denials have not been proven by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence. It bears stressing that alibi is the weakest of all defenses because it is facile to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and is generally rejected.[31] For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time.[32] In this case, appellant admits that on the night in question, he approached the victim and the latter allegedly attempted to strike him. In response thereto, appellant allegedly fired a warning shot in the air then left after reprimanding the group. However, this defense cannot prevail over the positive identification of appellant as the author of the crime by no less than three credible witnesses.[33] | |||||
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2005-08-11 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Thereafter, ALI filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction[13] to restrain the public respondent, Judge Lucenito Tagle, from implementing the Order dated 07 September 1995 and to declare null and void and expunging the entire deposition proceedings taken in connection with Civil Case No. 931-94.[14] | |||||
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2004-04-14 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| Against the positive identification by the eyewitness, appellant offered nothing but the lame defense of alibi. Alibi is the weakest of defenses, as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.[24] To merit serious consideration, this defense must be supported by credible corroboration, preferably from disinterested witnesses.[25] In the present case, not one of appellant's four friends who were allegedly with him on the night of the incident came forward to corroborate his alibi. | |||||
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2004-01-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In this case, we find the evidence proffered by the appellants in support of their respective alibis extremely weak. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that he could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[63] In this case, we note the following: a) Appellant Abes declared on cross-examination that his house was but two (2) kilometers away from the place where the Calaycay spouses resided.[64] | |||||
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2003-10-15 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| Jurisprudence has it that the defense of alibi is one of the weakest of defenses in criminal prosecution because the same is easy to concoct through relatives, friends and even those not related to the offender. [33] For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for appellants to prove that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed. They must also prove that they could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. [34] | |||||
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2003-08-28 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In the case at bar, greater probative value and evidentiary weight must be accorded to Emalyn's unwavering and categorical identification of the appellant as her ravisher over his self-serving denial and alibi. Moreover, for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must also prove that he could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[21] In appellant's case, it was not physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at the time the rape was committed. As correctly observed by the trial court:Judicial notice can be taken that the areas from Johnny Ang Paradise, where the accused lived, to Barrio Obrero, Dacera Farm is somewhere in between these places. Therefore, it was easy for the accused to have the opportunity to go to Barrio Obrero on August 27, 1992, at seven o'clock in the evening, from Johnny Ang Paradise. After seeing Emalyn at a store and enticing her to go with him to look for potatoes in order to rape her in the cornfield, the whole thing could be finished in less than thirty minutes. There were jeep and tricycle rides from Johnny Ang Paradise is located. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the accused rode on a passenger vehicle from Johnny Ang Paradise to Barrio Obrero, met the victim, brought her to Dacera Farm a kilometer away, and did the bestial act in the cornfield. Immediately, after finishing the rape, he hurriedly left, went to the highway, rode a jeep or tricycle to his place and pretended to do his usual work at 8:00 or 9:00 o'clock in the evening as if nothing had been done by him except selling his barbecued fish. In other words, the Court is of the opinion that even if the accused had gone away for an hour from Johnny Ang Paradise, it could not easily be noticed by other persons.[22] Appellant was charged with Forcible Abduction with Rape, however, he was convicted of statutory rape, considering that the victim was eight years old when the rape was committed and there was no evidence of forcible abduction inasmuch as the victim was merely persuaded to go with the appellant to look for potatoes. | |||||