This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2014-11-10 |
BRION, J. |
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| This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.[89] where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present case even admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what transpired. | |||||
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2014-11-10 |
BRION, J. |
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| In United States v. Snyder,[31] the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable.[32] With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of reasonableness.[33] | |||||
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2012-08-29 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Appellant, who was supposed to have gone to Batangas for a medical treatment on the same day, never came back. In fact, appellant's belongings, which were kept under the bamboo bed where the victim's body was found lying, were no longer there when the incident was discovered.[29] Moreover, when the victim's brother, Avanzado, went to the house of appellant's uncle in Batangas, appellant was nowhere to be found. Appellant was later apprehended in October 2000 in Capiz, so Avanzado went to Capiz to verify this but appellant was already released as the police feared that they might be charged with illegal detention. Notably, appellant knew that he was being arrested for the crime of robbery with homicide, yet he did not present himself to the authorities or to the victim's family to establish that he had nothing to do with the crime. In fact, he was not seen by the victim's family since the incident and it was only on March 25, 2001, after he was again apprehended in Capiz and brought to San Pablo City that Henry saw him at the police station.[30] These circumstances denote flight. The flight of an accused, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance from which an inference of guilt might be established, for a truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and assert his innocence.[31] | |||||
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2011-11-16 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The trial court's findings of facts, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses, its assessment of the probative weight of the evidence of the parties, as well as its conclusions anchored on the said findings, are accorded great weight, and even conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case. This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court to observe, at close range, the conduct, demeanor and the deportment of the witnesses as they testify.[49] We see no reason to overrule the trial court's finding that Trestiza is guilty of kidnapping with ransom. | |||||
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2007-04-13 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Moreover, the appellant was duly accorded the opportunity to testify on his behalf. The appellant was informed (by the judge and his own counsel) that in view of his refusal to testify on his behalf, the case would be decided based on the evidence submitted by the prosecution.[75] Yet, appellant still refused to testify. Although the appellant's silence and refusal to testify cannot be construed as evidence of guilt, this Court has consistently held that the fact that an accused never testified in his defense even in the face of accusations against him goes against the principle that "the first impulse of an innocent man when accused of wrongdoing is to express his innocence at the first opportune time."[76] | |||||