This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2015-09-16 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In addition, Julia cannot point to Demetrio's having successfully passed the PEME as basis for the conclusion that he acquired his illness on board the vessel. This is a non-sequitur. The PEME conducted upon a seafarer would not or could not necessarily reveal or disclose his illness because such examination is not at all fool-proof or thoroughly exploratory.[45] | |||||
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2015-08-26 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Petitioner assails the CA's finding which gave credence to the disability grading on petitioner's sickness accorded by Dr. Alegre, the company-designated physician, over that of Dr. Vicaldo's, petitioner's private physician, which involves a factual inquiry. Elementary is the principle that we are not a trier of facts; only errors of law are generally reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari criticizing decisions of the Court of Appeals.[22] Questions of fact are not entertained.[23] And in labor cases, this doctrine applies with greater force.[24] Factual questions are for labor tribunals to resolve.[25] However, since the findings of the LA and the NLRC, on one hand, and the Court of Appeals, on the other, are conflicting, we have to resolve the factual issues in this case together with the legal Issues. | |||||
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2014-10-01 |
BRION, J. |
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| This referral to a third doctor has been held by this Court to be a mandatory procedure as a consequence of the provision that it is the company-designated doctor whose assessment should prevail. In other words, the company can insist on its disability rating even against a contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer expresses his disagreement by asking for the referral to a third doctor who shall make his or her determination and whose decision is final and binding on the parties. We have followed this rule in a string of cases, among them, Philippine Hammonia,[21] Ayungo v. Beamko Shipmanagement Corp.,[22] Santiago v. Pacbasin Shipmanagement, Inc.,[23] Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency,[24] and Masangkay v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc.[25] Thus, at this point, the matter of referral pursuant to the provision of the POEA-SEC is a settled ruling. | |||||
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2010-11-22 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| But even granting arguendo that petitioner's illness was not pre-existing, he still had to show that his illness not only occurred during the term of his contract but also that it resulted from a work-related injury or illness, or at the very least aggravated by the conditions of the work for which he was contracted for.[28] Petitioner failed to discharge this burden, however.[29] | |||||
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2010-03-03 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| On these points, we sustain the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in granting total and permanent disability benefits in favor of Villamater, as it was sufficiently shown that his having contracted colon cancer was, at the very least, aggravated by his working conditions,[43] taking into consideration his dietary provisions on board, his age, and his job as Chief Engineer, who was primarily in charge of the technical and mechanical operations of the vessels to ensure voyage safety. Jurisprudence provides that to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of work-connection and not direct causal relation is required. Probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.[44] | |||||
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2010-02-22 |
ABAD, J. |
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| Whether or not respondent Abalos' illness is compensable is essentially a factual issue. Yet the Court can and will be justified in looking into it considering the conflicting views of the NLRC and the CA.[17] | |||||
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2009-12-04 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Petitioner's claim that he immediately reported to Sea Star office upon disembarkation and informed it of his present condition was discredited by the Labor Arbiter, which was affirmed by the NLRC and the appellate court. Such factual determination is a statutory function of the NLRC.[40] | |||||