This case has been cited 2 times or more.
|
2006-09-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar.[55] As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged with having intentionally burned the two-storey residential house of Robert Separa. Said conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven (7) adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple arson. Such is the case "notwithstanding the error in the designation of the offense in the information, the information remains effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime alleged therein."[56] "What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violate, x x x, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited."[57] | |||||
|
2004-06-10 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
||||
| True, appellant's defense of denial and alibi is weak and undeserving of serious consideration. But the argument that it is weak is of no moment. Settled is the rule that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[28] The prosecution must demonstrate the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, for an accusation is not synonymous with guilt.[29] | |||||