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ELVIRA YU OH v. CA

This case has been cited 8 times or more.

2009-09-18
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
A penal law, as defined by this Court, is an act of the legislature that prohibits certain acts and establishes penalties for its violation. It also defines crime, treats of its nature and provides for its punishment.[32] Here, the abovequoted proviso does not prohibit certain acts or provide penalties for its violation; neither does it describe the nature of a crime and its punishment. Consequently, the abovequoted phrase cannot be considered a penal provision.
2008-02-13
VELASCO JR., J.
x x x x It must be stressed that the abovementioned provision vested concurrent jurisdiction upon the said courts regardless of the imposable penalty. In fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case of the appellant was conferred by the aforecited law then in force (R.A. 6425 before amendment) when the information was filed. Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of the action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is, to stress, prospective in nature.[20] (Emphasis supplied.) This Court categorically reiterated the above ruling in the 2003 case of Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals,[21] in the 2004 case of Alonto v. People,[22] and in the 2005 case of Lee v. Court of Appeals.[23]
2007-09-28
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action[15] and not during the arraignment of the accused. The Information charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that time, the governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 129[16] which provides:Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance by the latter.
2006-12-20
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
P195,837.98 - amount to be credited to petitioner to be applied to pay the second loan.[9] We have repeatedly held that there is no violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 if the complainant was actually told by the drawer that he has no sufficient funds in a bank.[10] Where, as in the case at bar, the checks were issued as security for a loan, payment by the accused of the amount of the check prior to its presentation for payment would certainly serve the same purpose.
2005-11-18
CALLEJO, SR., J.
The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.[23]
2005-02-28
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the following: (a) the check is presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check; (b) the drawer or maker of the check receives notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee; and (c) the drawer or maker of the check fails to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or make arrangements for payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. In other words, the presumption is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment.[34] The presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of nonpayment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.[35]
2005-02-04
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The presumption that the issuer has knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received notice of dishonor and that within 5 banking days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its payment.[23] The prosecution is burdened to prove these acts that give rise to the prima facie presumption.[24]
2005-01-17
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In Yu Oh vs. Court of Appeals[52] the Court held that there is no violation of B.P. Blg. 22, if complainant was actually told by the drawer that he has no sufficient funds in the bank.[53]  In the present case, since there is no evidence that a categorical statement was given to private complainant when the subject check was issued to him, the above ruling cannot apply.