This case has been cited 20 times or more.
|
2012-04-18 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| For failure of FCC to accomplish the project within the agreed completion period, PDSC, in a letter[18] dated December 3, 1999, informed FCC that it was terminating their contract based on Article 12, Paragraph 12.1 of the Building Contract. Subsequently, PDSC sent demand letters[19] to FCC and its officers for the payment of liquidated damages amounting to ?9,149,962.02 for the delay. In the same manner, PDSC wrote PCIC asking for remuneration pursuant to Performance Bond No. 31915.[20] | |||||
|
2012-04-18 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| Despite notice, PDSC did not receive any reply from either FCC or PCIC, constraining it to file a complaint[21] for damages, recovery of possession of personal property and/or foreclosure of mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin and writ of attachment, against FCC and its officers before the RTC. PDSC later filed a supplemental complaint[22] impleading PCIC, claiming coverage under Performance Bond No. 31915 in the amount of P6,828,329.66. | |||||
|
2008-12-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| In the case of Eduardo, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered in his favor. The evidence shows that appellant surrendered to a person in authority a day after the incident. This fact was not contested by the prosecution. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. With no aggravating circumstances and one generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty imposable on the appellant, in accordance with Article 63(3) of the Revised Penal Code, should be the minimum period, which is reclusion perpetua.[41] | |||||
|
2006-02-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| Petitioner's asseveration that it is unthinkable for him to shoot private complainant because he has no motive to harm, much less kill the latter, he being a total stranger, deserves scant consideration. It must be stressed that motive is a state of (one's) mind which others cannot discern. It is not an element of the crime, and as such does not have to be proved. In fact, lack of motive for committing a crime does not preclude conviction. It is judicial knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for no reason at all.[39] Even in the absence of a known motive, the time-honored rule is that motive is not essential to convict when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit.[40] Motive assumes significance only where there is no showing of who the perpetrator of the crime was.[41] In the case at bar, since petitioner has been positively identified as the assailant, the lack of motive is no longer of consequence. | |||||
|
2005-08-21 |
PER CURIAM |
||||
| Appellants likewise claimed that we should have not sustained the trial court's rejection of their alibi. Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.[11] Being evidence that is negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.[12] On top of its inherent weakness, alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is corroborated only by relatives or close friends of the accused.[13] | |||||
|
2005-07-21 |
PER CURIAM |
||||
| Appellants likewise claimed that we should have not sustained the trial court's rejection of their alibi. Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.[11] Being evidence that is negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.[12] On top of its inherent weakness, alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is corroborated only by relatives or close friends of the accused.[13] | |||||
|
2004-07-07 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| In questioning the veracity of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the appellants thereby assail the trial court's factual findings. It is well-settled that the findings of facts and the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial court's findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case.[38] | |||||
|
2004-06-15 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| Well-settled is the rule that the findings of a trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial judge has a clear advantage over the appellate magistrate in appreciating testimonial evidence. The trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witness as he had the unique opportunity to observe the witness firsthand and note his demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination. Absent any showing that the trial court's calibration of credibility was flawed, we are bound by its assessment.[27] Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath all of which are useful aid for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial court's findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case.[28] | |||||
|
2004-06-10 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| The appellant's denial of the crime charged cannot prevail over the positive declarations of prosecution witnesses Randy and Rona. The defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[15] | |||||
|
2004-05-28 |
AZCUNA, J. |
||||
| Romeo cannot be faulted for not helping his brother even as the latter was being stabbed and struck to death. No standard form of behavioral response can be expected from anyone when confronted with a startling or frightful occurrence.[30] Moreover, this Court does not find anything unnatural in Romeo's failure to help his brother as he was only thirteen years old when the crime happened. Furthermore, as also observed by the Court of Appeals, Romeo did plead with appellants to stop beating his brother. He simply had to flee when appellants turned to him. | |||||
|
2004-05-19 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
||||
| Furthermore, the fact that Brazal is the cousin of the victim,[30] far from tainting the former's testimony with bias, even renders it more credible. It would be unnatural for a relative, who would normally be interested in bringing the real culprits to justice, to accuse someone else of having committed the crime.[31] | |||||
|
2004-04-14 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| The question of whether or not the appellant acted in self-defense is one of fact.[37] The trial court ruled, after calibrating the evidence on record, that the appellant's plea of self-defense had no factual basis, and that, in fact, he was the unlawful aggressor. The settled rule is that the trial court's findings are accorded finality, unless there appears on the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which if properly considered, would alter the result of the case.[38] This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court of observing at close range the conduct, demeanor, and deportment of the witnesses as they regale the trial court with their testimonies. The trial court gave credence and probative weight to the collective testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We have carefully reviewed the records and find no justification to deviate from the findings of the trial court. | |||||
|
2004-03-04 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| In a long line of cases, the Court has pronounced that the credibility of witnesses as assessed by the trial court will generally not be disturbed.[49] This is because the trial court enjoys the unique position of having observed the elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied appellate courts.[50] As the Court fully explained in People vs. Lachica:[51] Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. | |||||
|
2004-03-04 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| The fact that Marcita and Helen are related to the victim also does not lessen their credibility. The weight of the testimony of witnesses is not impaired nor in anyway affected by their relationship to the victim when there is no showing of improper motives on their part.[57] The relationship of a witness to the victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would even render it more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.[58] Moreover, as relatives of the victim, they would naturally have a knack for remembering the face of the assailants for they, more than anybody else would be concerned with seeking justice for the victim and bringing the malefactors to face the law.[59] | |||||
|
2004-03-04 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| The Court is not persuaded by appellants' specious argument that prosecution witness HenryValencia could not have been at the scene of the crime for if he were, he would have tried to defend the victim; that his not having done so means that he was not at the scene when the stabbing took place.[61] The Court is not persuaded to adopt this view. This Court has consistently noted in earlier cases that no standard form of behavioral response could be expected from anyone, when confronted with a strange, startling or frightful occurrence. Fear has been known to render people immobile and helpless particularly in life and death situations. It is also a natural occurrence that a person faced with such an overwhelming opposition would sufficiently be cowed by fear or at least compelled to act in a manner aimed at self-preservation.[62] | |||||
|
2004-03-04 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| Q: Please describe them. A: They used knives.[63] Appellants vehemently deny having committed the crime. Jurisprudence however holds that denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters that appellants were at the scene of the crime and were the victim's assailants.[64] To merit credibility, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability.[65] Also, being a negative defense, denial must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise, it would merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value of the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.[66] | |||||
|
2004-03-04 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| Q: Please describe them. A: They used knives.[63] Appellants vehemently deny having committed the crime. Jurisprudence however holds that denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters that appellants were at the scene of the crime and were the victim's assailants.[64] To merit credibility, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability.[65] Also, being a negative defense, denial must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise, it would merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value of the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.[66] | |||||
|
2004-03-04 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| Consistent with recent jurisprudence, we sustain the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of the deceased.[100] Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is also proper in this case as the wife had testified on the mental and emotional suffering inflicted on the part of the heirs of the victim.[101] | |||||
|
2004-03-04 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| No actual damages, may be awarded because no competent evidence was presented to prove this claim. However, temperate damages may be recovered under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot from the nature of the case be proved with certainty. In this case, the amount of P25,000.00 would be sufficient considering that it is undisputed that the family incurred expenses for the wake and burial of the victim.[102] In addition, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be awarded due to the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery in this case.[103] | |||||
|
2004-02-06 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
||||
| The rationale for this doctrine as explained in People vs. Cayabyab is that the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt and innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insistent assertion; or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie; or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer; or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion, or looked down in confession, or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.[10] (citations omitted) Such settled rule aside, a close scrutiny of the testimonies of both prosecution witnesses reveals that appellant was categorically and positively identified as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Mariaca testified thus: Q: And what did this actually (sic) Foncardas and Dequiña do when they approached Napoleon Erno? A: They helped one another in mauling him. Q: Now, for how long more or less was the mauling? A: About 5 minutes because he fell down and he was able to stand-up again. Q: What happened next to Napoleon Erno? A: He was held and again Duetes mauled him. Q: How about Foncardas, what else did he do? A: He also helped in mauling Napoleon Erno. Q: After that what did Foncardas do if any? A: Napoleon Erno became dizzy or he was groggy, it appear to me he held on to a table. Q: What did Foncardas do? A: They again approached him at the back of Erno, and they held both hands of Erno. Q: Who held the hands of Napoleon Erno? A: Duetes and Foncardas. Q: And after that what did Foncardas do? A: At that instance Cocoy arrived. Q: Who is this Cocoy? A: Quijada. Q: You are referring to Cocoy who is one of the accused in this case, but he is at large? A: Yes, sir. Q: Where did Cocoy come from? A: I don't know because all of a sudden he appeared. Q: When he appeared did he join the group? A: He was already carrying a piece of wood. Q: You are referring to Quijada? A: Yes, sir.[11] x x x Q: With that wood, what did Quijada do? A: He struck Erno with that wood. [12] x x x Q: While accused Quijada struck Napoleon Erno with this piece of wood, what was accused Foncardas doing at that time? A: The two of them, Foncardas and Duetes, held both hands of Napoleon Erno.[13] (Emphasis supplied) And Cabag testified thus: | |||||