This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2009-01-19 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Moreover, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and are not reviewable by the Supreme Court. They carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of a lower fact-finding body,[48] as in the instant case. | |||||
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2007-03-01 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| It is well to stress the settled rule that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as the SEC, will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence. They carry even more weight when affirmed by the CA.[8] Such findings are accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that it had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.[9] This rule is rooted in the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, as well as in the respect to be accorded the determinations made by administrative bodies in general on matters falling within their respective fields of specialization or expertise.[10] | |||||
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2006-08-07 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Neither is the petition for prohibition before the trial court violative of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Said doctrine precludes a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.[38] An exception to this rule is when the issue raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency.[39] In the instant case, the legal question of whether a memorandum of the ARMM Governor, ordering the reinstatement of an employee declared AWOL and dropped from the rolls, was issued in excess of jurisdiction is a legal question which should be resolved by the courts. For the same reason that the issues to be resolved in this case are purely legal in nature, respondent need not abide by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.[40] Besides, to allow the matter to remain with the Office of the ARMM Governor for resolution would be self-defeating and useless and cause unnecessary delay since it was the same office which gave the conflicting issuances on petitioner's reinstatement. | |||||
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2005-09-16 |
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| The general rule is that obligations incurred by a corporation, acting through its directors, officers or employees, are its sole liabilities. However, the veil with which the law covers and isolates the corporation from its directors, officers or employees will be lifted when the corporation is used by any of them as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality or injustice.[9] Here, the fraud was committed by petitioners to the prejudice of respondent bank. It bears emphasis that as reported by the sheriff, TVI is no longer doing business at its given address and its whereabouts cannot be established as yet. | |||||
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2005-08-15 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The existence of interlocking directors, corporate officers and shareholders, which the respondent court considered, is not enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction, in the absence of fraud or other public policy considerations.[24] But even when there is dominance over the affairs of the subsidiary, the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction applies only when such fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime.[25] To warrant resort to this extraordinary remedy, there must be proof that the corporation is being used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work injustice.[26] Any piercing of the corporate veil has to be done with caution.[27] The wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot just be presumed.[28] | |||||
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2005-07-15 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The existence of interlocking directors, corporate officers and shareholders, which the respondent court considered, is not enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction, in the absence of fraud or other public policy considerations.[24] But even when there is dominance over the affairs of the subsidiary, the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction applies only when such fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime.[25] To warrant resort to this extraordinary remedy, there must be proof that the corporation is being used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work injustice.[26] Any piercing of the corporate veil has to be done with caution.[27] The wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot just be presumed.[28] | |||||