Lawyerly

You're currently signed in as:
User

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN

This case has been cited 22 times or more.

	GR No. 212426 2016-01-12	SAGUISAG v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OCHOA SERENO, C.J.
A number of significant amendments to the 1947 MBA were made.[45] With respect to its duration, the parties entered into the Ramos-Rusk Agreement of 1966, which reduced the term of the treaty from 99 years to a total of 44 years or until 1991.[46] Concerning the number of U.S. military bases in the country, the Bohlen-Serrano Memorandum of Agreement provided for the return to the Philippines of 17 U.S. military bases covering a total area of 117,075 hectares.[47] Twelve years later, the U.S. returned Sangley Point in Cavite City through an exchange of notes.[48] Then, through the Romulo-Murphy Exchange of Notes of 1979, the parties agreed to the recognition of Philippine sovereignty over Clark and Subic Bases and the reduction of the areas that could be used by the U.S. military.[49] The agreement also provided for the mandatory review of the treaty every five years.[50] In 1983, the parties revised the 1947 MBA through the Romualdez-Armacost Agreement.[51] The revision pertained to the operational use of the military bases by the U.S. government within the context of Philippine sovereignty,[52] including the need for prior consultation with the Philippine government on the former's use of the bases for military combat operations or the establishment of long-range missiles.[53]
	GR Nos. 212140-41 2015-01-21	SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA v. BERSAMIN CARPIO, J.
On 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 a Joint Resolution[9] which found probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his co-respondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the Joint Resolution dated 28 March 2014) dated 7 April 2014. Sen. Estrada prayed for the issuance of a new resolution dismissing the charges against him.
	GR No. 205728 2015-01-21	DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC LEONEN, J.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.[14] They question respondents' notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter issued on February 27, 2013. They pray that: (1) the petition be given due course; (2) a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents from further proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal of the Team Patay tarpaulin; and (3) after notice and hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and void, and permanently restraining respondents from enforcing them or any other similar order.[15]
	GR No. 209287 2014-07-01	MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III BERSAMIN, J.
The requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review are the following, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the Court; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.[36]
	GR No. 209287 2014-07-01	MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III BERSAMIN, J.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer's suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen's suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right, however…the people are the real parties…It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer's suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."[45]
	GR No. 203335 2014-04-22	JOSE JESUS M. DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ABAD, J.
The United Nations Special Rapporteur,[4] Frank La Rue, acknowledged the material distinction. He pointed out that "[t]he vast potential and benefits of the Internet are rooted in its unique characteristics, such as its speed, worldwide reach and relative anonymity." For this reason, while many governments advocate freedom online, they recognize the necessity to regulate certain aspects of the use of this media to protect the most vulnerable.[5]
	GR No. 204819 2014-04-08	JAMES M. IMBONG v. PAQUITO N. OCHOA MENDOZA, J.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.[101] A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.[102]
	GR No. 204819 2014-04-08	JAMES M. IMBONG v. PAQUITO N. OCHOA MENDOZA, J.
(14) Petition for Prohibition[32] filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
	GR No. 204819 2014-04-08	JAMES M. IMBONG v. PAQUITO N. OCHOA MENDOZA, J.
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.[49]
	GR No. 208566 2013-11-19	GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.[120] This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute."[121] In other words, "[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."[122] Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action."[123] "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."[124]
	GR No. 193415 2012-04-18	SPS. DAISY AND SOCRATES M. AREVALO v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK SERENO, J.
The Constitution provides that judicial power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."[43] The exercise of judicial power requires an actual case calling for it. The courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions, or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests.[44] Furthermore, courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.[45] As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist.[46] An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution, as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.[47] There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.[48]
	GR No. 172712 2012-03-21	STRADCOM CORPORATION v. HILARIO L. LAQUI AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC OF QUEZON CITY PEREZ, J.
While courts should abstain from expressing its opinion where no legal relief is needed or called for,[33] we are well aware of the fact that the "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that should automatically dissuade courts from resolving a case. Accordingly, it has been held that a court will decide a case, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that: (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[34] None of these exceptions is, however, present in this case.
	GR No. 190293 2012-03-20	PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO ABAD, J.
In Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP),[27] the Court ruled that once a suit is filed, the Court cannot automatically be deprived of its jurisdiction over a case by the mere expedient of the doer voluntarily ceasing to perform the challenged conduct. Otherwise, the doer would be dictating when this Court should relinquish its jurisdiction over a case. Further, a case is not mooted when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the violation.[28]
	GR No. 188376 2011-12-14	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. FEDERICO SUNTAY BERSAMIN, J.
In addition, in Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP),[74] the Court has come to consider a voluntary cessation by the defendant or the doer of the activity complained of as another exception to the moot-and-academic principle, the explanation for the exception being that: xxx once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the violation.
	GR No. 180050 2011-04-12	RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA NACHURA, J.
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised.[19]
	GR Nos. 171947-48 2011-02-15	MMDA v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY VELASCO JR., J.
Even the ponente is passionate about according respect to the system of separation of powers between the three equal branches of the government. In his dissenting opinion in the 2008 case of Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP),[39] Justice Velasco emphatically stated: Separation of Powers to be Guarded
	GR No. 191618 2010-11-23	ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL NACHURA, J.
On more than one occasion we have characterized a proper party as one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of.[9] The dust has long settled on the test laid down in Baker v. Carr:[10] "whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult questions."[11] Until and unless such actual or threatened injury is established, the complainant is not clothed with legal personality to raise the constitutional question.
	GR No. 166910 2010-10-19	ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD VELASCO JR., J.
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. x x x [I]t is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.[24]
	GR No. 168583 2010-07-26	ATTY. ALLAN S. MONTA×O v. ATTY. ERNESTO C. VERCELES DEL CASTILLO, J.
During the pendency of this case, the challenged term of office held and served by Atty. Montaño expired in 2006, thereby rendering the issues of the case moot. In addition, Atty. Verceles' appointment in 2003 as NLRC Commissioner rendered the case moot as such supervening event divested him of any interest in and affiliation with the federation in accordance with Article 213 of the Labor Code. However, in a number of cases,[37] we still delved into the merits notwithstanding supervening events that would ordinarily render the case moot, if the issues are capable of repetition, yet evading review, as in this case.
	AM No. 08-6-352-RTC 2009-08-19	QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE BRION, J.
As we stated at the outset, this administrative matter confronts us, not merely with the task of determining how the Court will respond to the query, both with respect to the substance and form (as the Court does not give interpretative opinions[9] but can issue circulars and regulations relating to pleading, practice and procedure in all courts[10] and in the exercise of its administrative supervision over all courts and personnel thereof[11]), but also with the task of responding to admitted violations of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 and to multiple recourses on the same subject.
	GR No. 167614 2009-03-24	ANTONIO M. SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination;[47] (2) that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party[48] and at the earliest opportunity;[49] and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case,[50] otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on some other ground.[51]