This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2013-09-25 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| We have previously ruled that lease contracts, by their nature, are not personal. The general rule, therefore, is lease contracts survive the death of the parties and continue to bind the heirs except if the contract states otherwise.[34] In Sui Man Hui Chan v. Court of Appeals,[35] we held that:A lease contract is not essentially personal in character. Thus, the rights and obligations therein are transmissible to the heirs. The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. In the subject Contract of Lease, not only were there no stipulations prohibiting any transmission of rights, but its very terms and conditions explicitly provided for the transmission of the rights of the lessor and of the lessee to their respective heirs and successors. The contract is the law between the parties. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract, which involves a property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the successors or representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract. | |||||
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2013-06-19 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Even assuming that certiorari is the proper remedy, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent's motion to dismiss. It, in fact, acted correctly when it issued the questioned orders as respondent's motion to dismiss was filed SIX YEARS AND FIVE MONTHS AFTER SHE FILED HER AMENDED ANSWER. This circumstance alone already warranted the outright dismissal of the motion for having been filed in clear contravention of the express mandate of Section 1, Rule 16, of the Revised Rules of Court. Under this provision, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for but before the filing of an answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.[24] | |||||
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2008-02-13 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| [Any controversy with regard to the contract] shall not be cause of any action of any kind whatsoever in any court or administrative agency but shall, upon notice of one party to the other, be referred to a Board of Arbitrators consisting of three (3) members, one to be selected by BENGUET, another to be selected by the OWNER and the third to be selected by the aforementioned two arbiters so appointed.[24] (Emphasis supplied.) There can be no quibbling that POA is a quasi-judicial body which forms part of the DENR, an administrative agency. Hence, the provision on mandatory resort to arbitration, freely entered into by the parties, must be held binding against them.[25] | |||||
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2006-07-14 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Furthermore, as private respondent correctly points out, the assailed resolutions were no more than interlocutory rulings. The CA after all had not come up with a final decision on the petition but merely asserted that it could rule on the question of prescription. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts, acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the court.[30] | |||||
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2005-04-12 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| A lease contract is not essentially personal in character.[26] Thus, the rights and obligations therein are transmissible to the heirs. The general rule is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law.[27] | |||||