This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2008-10-06 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| [60] Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Tongson, 459 Phil. 742, 753 (2003). | |||||
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2004-07-22 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| On the first assigned error, let it be stressed that the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter are non-litigious in nature. Section 6, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 01-02, Series of 2002, provides: "SECTION 6. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS. The proceedings before a Labor Arbiter shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the court of law shall not strictly apply thereto. The Labor Arbiter may avail himself of all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy speedily, including ocular inspection and examination of well-informed persons." Clearly, the Appellate Court, in rejecting petitioner's claim that he was deprived of his right to cross-examine the three witnesses, did not err as it was not required to apply strictly the Rules of Evidence.[4] At any rate, respondent had valid reasons why it did not present those three witnesses during the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, thus: "x x x. For the information of the Honorable Commission, Carlos Cruz was not presented during the trial because he met an untimely death in the course thereof. On the other hand, Edwin Dancel resigned from the Company and then migrated to the United States. With respect to Danilo Teodoro, he availed of the benefits under the Special Separation Program of the company and since then, his whereabouts remained unknown. x x x."[5] This case is analogous to Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Tongson[6] where we emphasized the principle that technical rules of evidence are invariably relaxed when applied to proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, thus: "In fact, the hearing before these agencies does not connote full adversarial proceedings. What is required, among others, is that every litigant is given reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his right, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor." Relative to the second assigned error, we find that there is substantial evidence to support the finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's dismissal from the service is valid. Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial proof, and not clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient as basis for the imposition of any disciplinary action upon the employee. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the employer, as in this case, has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his position.[7] That petitioner violated respondent MERALCO's Code of Employee Discipline and committed serious misconduct in the performance of his duties have been proved by the affidavits of petitioner's own subordinates in Squad 12 of which he was the Assistant Squad Leader. Moreover, respondent had lost his trust and confidence in petitioner. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, these are just causes for his dismissal from the service. | |||||