This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2007-11-23 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Even when this Court recognized the importance of deciding cases on the merits to better serve the ends of justice, it has stressed that the liberality in the application of rules of procedure may not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay in the administration of justice.[22] The Court eyes with disfavor the unjustified delay in the termination of cases; once a judgment has become final, the winning party must not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict, through a mere subterfuge. The time spent by the judiciary, more so of this Court, in taking cognizance and resolving cases is not limitless and cannot be wasted on cases devoid of any right calling for vindication and are merely reprehensible efforts to evade the operation of a decision that is final and executory.[23] | |||||
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2006-03-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| However, such liberality in the application of rules of procedure may not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay in the administration of justice. It is equally settled that, save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice.[23] | |||||
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2005-11-22 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Though heavy workload and extreme pressures may be allowed under the principle of substantial justice as a reason for the grant of an extension of time, the Court of Appeals has no authority to grant an extension of thirty days, or beyond the fifteen days allowed under the Rules. We cannot fault the appellate court for faithfully complying with the rules of procedure which it has been mandated to observe.[12] Save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice.[13] In the present case, petitioner filed the petition on May 15, 2002 or thirty days after the reglementary period. Even if petitioner would have been given the maximum allowed extension of fifteen days, the petition would still be late. Bear in mind that the filing of the petition within the reglementary period is jurisdictional. The assailed NLRC resolutions became final upon the failure to file the petition within the prescribed period. It pains us to deny this appeal, but a final judgment is beyond the power of the Court of Appeals, or of this Court, to alter without compelling reason. | |||||
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2005-10-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We likewise have enunciated that the Rules of Court are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases. In not a few instances, we relaxed the rigid application of the rules to afford the parties opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served.[14] | |||||
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2005-10-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We cannot fault the appellate court for faithfully complying with the rules of procedure which it has been mandated to observe.[15] Save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice.[16] | |||||
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2005-09-27 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In the recent case of Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acuña,[25] we held that "the failure to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition may be excused since the dates are evident from the records." The more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of Appeals is the date of receipt of the trial court's order denying the motion for reconsideration, which date is admittedly stated in the petition in the present case. The other material dates may be gleaned from the records of the case if reasonably evident. Thus, in this case the Court deems it proper to relax the Rules to give all the parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses.[26] | |||||
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2005-06-27 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| the records." The more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of Appeals is the date of receipt of the trial court's order denying the motion for reconsideration, which date is admittedly stated in the petition in the present case. The other material dates may be gleaned from the records of the case if reasonably evident. Thus, in this case the Court deems it proper to relax the Rules to give all the parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses.[26] WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 22 February 2000 and 29 November 2000. This case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is DIRECTED to reinstate and give due course to the petition in CA-G.R. | |||||
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2004-11-25 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| In not a few instances, we relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the time honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfections should thus not serve as bases of decisions. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.[25] | |||||
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2003-09-23 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In Ginete v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[9] it was held that the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. It is a time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses.[10] | |||||