This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2008-09-26 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The matter of whether petitioners can invoke substantial compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, has been settled in Mason v. Court of Appeals,[28] thus:The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant case. In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, entered into a sale with development agreement with private respondent Imperial Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply with its contractual obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for breach of contract and damages at the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, was served upon Villarosa through its branch manager at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that there was substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction over Villarosa. The latter questioned the denial before us in its petition for certiorari. We decided in Villarosa's favor and declared the trial court without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. We held that there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as service was made through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. We discarded the trial court's basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private respondent's substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, and fully agreed with petitioner's assertions that the enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, we said, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. | |||||
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2008-08-06 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to receive summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is limited and more clearly specified in the new rule. The phrase `agent, or any of its directors' has been conspicuously deleted.[8] Moreover, the argument of substantial compliance is no longer compelling. We have ruled that the new rule, as opposed to Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court, is restricted, limited and exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have done so in clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is required.[9] | |||||
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2008-07-09 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a domestic corporation is restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius.[11] Service must therefore be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. | |||||