This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2010-03-02 |
BRION, J. |
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| Unless the parties stipulated it, rescission is allowed only when the breach of the contract is substantial and fundamental to the fulfillment of the obligation.[34] Whether the breach is slight or substantial is largely determined by the attendant circumstances.[35] | |||||
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2006-07-27 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Settled is the rule that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified, or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.[26] In Mallilin, Jr. v. Castillo[27], the Court held that an action is considered as an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul, or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement.[28] On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.[29] In the present case, the attack on respondent's title is definitely merely collateral as the relief being sought by respondent in his action was recovery of ownership and possession. Petitioners' attack on the validity of respondent's certificate of title was merely raised as a defense in their Answer filed with the trial court. | |||||
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2004-06-04 |
PUNO, J. |
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| Thus, as adverted to in Song Fo & Co. v. Hawaiian Philippine Co.,[15] we ruled that a delay in the payment for a small quantity of molasses for some twenty (20) days is not such a violation of an essential condition of the contract that warrants rescission due to non-performance. In Philippine Amusement Enterprise, Inc. v. Natividad,[16] we declined rescission for "the occasional failure of the phonograph to operate, not frequent enough to render it unsuitable and unserviceable." In Laforteza v. Machuca,[17] we said that the delay of one month in payment was a mere casual breach that would not entitle the respondents to rescind the contract. In Ang v. Court of Appeals,[18] we held that the failure to remove and clear the subject property of all occupants and obstructions and deliver all the pertinent papers to the vendees for the registration and issuance of a certificate of title in their name were not essential conditions but merely incidental undertakings which will not permit rescission. In Power Commercial and Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[19] we went a step further and considered the failure of the vendor to eject the occupants of a lot sold as a "usual warranty against eviction," and not a condition that was not met, and thus, rescission was not allowed. And, in Del Castillo v. Nanguiat,[20] we ruled that the failure to pay in full the purchase price stipulated in a deed of sale does not ipso facto grant the seller the right to rescind the agreement. In all these cases, we were consistent in holding that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only such substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement. | |||||