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SPS. PRUDENCIO ROBLES AND SUSANA DE ROBLES v. CA

This case has been cited 3 times or more.

	GR No. 184301 2015-03-23	GE MONEY BANK v. SPS. VICTORINO M. DIZON AND ROSALINA L. DIZON PERALTA, J.
The Spouses Dizon claimed that they negotiated with the Bank for the extension of the period to redeem and that the latter granted the same. Aside from the Bank's vehement denial of the allegation, the Court cannot give credence to their assertions as they failed to present any documentary evidence to prove the conferment of the purported extension. Assuming, but without admitting, that an additional period was granted to them, the extension would constitute a mere offer on the part of the Bank to re-sell the subject property; it does not constitute a binding contract.[57] The right to redeem of the Spouses Dizon already expired on October 18, 1994. Thereafter, their offer should aptly be termed as a repurchase, not redemption. The Bank is not bound by the bid price, at the very least, and has the discretion to even set a higher price. As We explained: The right to redeem becomes functus officio on the date of its expiry, and its exercise after the period is not really one of redemption but a repurchase. Distinction must be made because redemption is by force of law; the purchaser at public auction is bound to accept redemption. Repurchase, however, of foreclosed property, after redemption period, imposes no such obligation. After expiry, the purchaser may or may not re-sell the property but no law will compel him to do so. And, he is not bound by the bid price; it is entirely within his discretion to set a higher price, for after all, the property already belongs to him as owner.[58]
	GR No. 176929 2008-07-04	INOCENCIO Y. LUCASAN FOR HIMSELF v. PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION AS RECEIVER NACHURA, J.
Undoubtedly, Lucasan's right to redeem the subject properties had elapsed on June 5, 1982. His offer to redeem the same in 1997 or long after the expiration of the redemption period is not really one for redemption but for repurchase. Thus, PBC and PDIC, its receiver and liquidator, are no longer bound by the bid price. It is entirely within their discretion to set a higher price. As we explained in De Robles v. Court of Appeals:[25]
	GR NO. 164910 2005-09-30	UNION BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. CA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Foreclosure proceedings have in their favor the presumption of regularity and the burden of evidence to rebut the same is on the party that seeks to challenge the proceedings.[20] Likewise, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty applies in this case in favor of the Sheriff.[21] These presumptions have not been rebutted by convincing and substantial evidence by DRI.