This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2013-01-22 |
SERENO, J. |
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| On the other hand, respondent Jose Melo, then chairperson of the COMELEC, opposes the Petition and argues inter alia that this Court has already resolved the matter in Fariñas v. Executive Secretary.[1] | |||||
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2012-07-24 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Petitioner goes on to assail E.O. 13 as violative of the equal protection clause pointing to the arbitrariness of limiting the IAD-ODESLA's investigation only to presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in the government. The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.[29] It is embraced under the due process concept and simply requires that, in the application of the law, "all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed."[30] The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable classification so that aggrupations bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other. This we ruled in Farinas v. Executive Secretary,[31] wherein we further stated that | |||||
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2010-02-22 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned provisions challenged in the case at bar violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution in Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.[25] | |||||
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2009-12-01 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| In Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.,[45] Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 was challenged on the ground, among others, that it was violative of the equal protection clause of the constitution. The petitioners contended that Section 14 discriminated against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elected official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elected officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains -- they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. | |||||
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2005-09-01 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| In the recent case of Fariñas vs. The Executive Secretary,[20] the Court En Banc, unanimously reiterated and emphasized its adherence to the "enrolled bill doctrine," thus, declining therein petitioners' plea for the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. Assailed in said case was Congress's creation of two sets of bicameral conference committees, the lack of records of said committees' proceedings, the alleged violation of said committees of the rules of both houses, and the disappearance or deletion of one of the provisions in the compromise bill submitted by the bicameral conference committee. It was argued that such irregularities in the passage of the law nullified R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act. | |||||
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2005-09-01 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| So given this situation, we at the Department of Finance believe that we really need to front-end our deficit reduction. Because it is deficit that is causing the increase of the debt and we are in what we call a debt spiral. The more debt you have, the more deficit you have because interest and debt service eats and eats more of your revenue. We need to get out of this debt spiral. And the only way, I think, we can get out of this debt spiral is really have a front-end adjustment in our revenue base.[65] The image portrayed is chilling. Congress passed the law hoping for rescue from an inevitable catastrophe. Whether the law is indeed sufficient to answer the state's economic dilemma is not for the Court to judge. In the Fariñas case, the Court refused to consider the various arguments raised therein that dwelt on the wisdom of Section 14 of R.A. No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), pronouncing that: . . . policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.[66] In the same vein, the Court in this case will not dawdle on the purpose of Congress or the executive policy, given that it is not for the judiciary to "pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation."[67] | |||||
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2005-09-01 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| It was only in 1987, when President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 273, that the VAT system was rationalized by imposing a multi-stage tax rate of 0% or 10% on all sales using the "tax credit method."[15] | |||||