Lawyerly

GR No. 200903

2014-07-22

KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP v. JESSIE ROBREDO

BRION, J.

The petitioners seem to have forgotten that a writ of prohibition only lies against the tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person's exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.[14] We issue a writ of prohibition to afford the aggrieved party a relief against the respondent's usurpation or grave abuse of jurisdiction or power.[15]

GR No. 164632

2008-10-29

URETHANE TRADING SPECIALIST v. EDWIN ONG

NACHURA, J.

Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the rule that the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is because a certiorari writ is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.[18] The appropriate course of action of the movant in such event is to file an answer[19] and interpose as affirmative defenses the objections raised in the motion to dismiss.[20] If, later, the decision of the trial judge is adverse, the movant may then elevate on appeal the same issues raised in the motion.[21]

GR No. 175930-31

2008-02-11

NICOLAS v. SANDIGANBAYAN

CARPIO MORALES, J.

On whether certiorari is the proper remedy in the consolidated petitions, the general rule prevailing is that it does not lie to review an order denying a demurrer to evidence, which is equivalent to a motion to dismiss, filed after the prosecution has presented its evidence and rested its case.[33]

GR NO. 164934

2007-08-14

HEIRS OF FLORENCIO ADOLFO v. VICTORIA P. CABRAL

QUISUMBING, J.

Specific and general provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657 and its implementing rules and procedure address the issue of jurisdiction. Section 50 of Rep. Act No. 6657 confers on the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) quasi-judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reform matters. In the process of reorganizing the DAR, Executive Order No. 129-A[25] created the DARAB to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform matters.[26]

GR NO. 163980

2006-08-03

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR

TINGA, J.

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[21] Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.[22] Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.[23] Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners' allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.

GR NO. 157491

2006-06-20

SPS. PROCESO AMURAO AND MINERVA AMURAO v. SPS. JACINTO VILLALOBOS AND HERMINIGILDA VILLALOBOS

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In Teresita S. David v. Agustin Rivera,[23] this Court held that: [I]t is safe to conclude that the existence of prior agricultural tenancy relationship, if true, will divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction the previous juridical tie compels the characterization of the controversy as an "agrarian dispute." x x x Even if the tenurial arrangement has been severed, the action still involves an incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship. Where the case involves the dispossession by a former landlord of a former tenant of the land claimed to have been given as compensation in consideration of the renunciation of the tenurial rights, there clearly exists an agrarian dispute. On this point the Court has already ruled:Indeed, section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199, provides that 'all cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant ... shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.' This jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the relationship of landlord and tenant - at the time of the dispute. The same may have arisen, and often times arises, precisely from the previous termination of such relationship. If the same existed immediately, or shortly, before the controversy and the subject-matter thereof is whether or not said relationship has been lawfully terminated, or if the dispute springs or originates from the relationship of landlord and tenant, the litigation is (then) cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations . . . . In the case at bar, petitioners' claim that the tenancy relationship has been terminated by the Kasulatan is of no moment. As long as the subject matter of the dispute is the legality of the termination of the relationship, or if the dispute originates from such relationship, the case is cognizable by the DAR, through the DARAB. The severance of the tenurial arrangement will not render the action beyond the ambit of an agrarian dispute.[24]

GR NO. 157307

2006-02-27

AGUSTIN RIVERA v. NEMESIO DAVID

First, on the matter of jurisdiction. We agree with petitioner that the DAR has jurisdiction over his case. In the 2004 case of David v. Rivera,[16] a case involving the same parcel of land here, filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mabalacat by the respondent against petitioner, the issue raised was whether the MCTC or the DAR had jurisdiction. Therein, we held that the existence of prior agricultural tenancy relationship characterizes the controversy as an "agrarian dispute", adding that"

GR NO. 144652

2005-12-16

ARCADIO B. DANDOY v. ZACARIAS TONGSON

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

It must be emphasized that the complaint filed by petitioners is one for the declaration of nullity of the agricultural leasehold contracts. Petitioners' stance is that the contracts are not valid based primarily on the ground that respondents are not the lawful owners of the property subject of the contract. On the other hand, respondents contend that there exists a tenancy relationship between them and petitioners. Thus, the question whether or not there exists an agricultural tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondents arises. It is incumbent upon the trial court to first hear and receive evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not there was indeed a tenancy relationship. Thus, in David vs. Rivera,[20] the Court held that where the very issue determinative of the question of jurisdiction is the real relationship existing between the parties, it is necessary that evidence be first presented by the parties before the question of jurisdiction may be passed upon by the court. Once its existence is established, the trial court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.[21] But if it is shown that there was no tenancy relationship, then the trial court properly has jurisdiction over the case, and the next logical step is to determine whether the agricultural leasehold contracts are invalid. In this case, the RTC found no tenancy relationship between the parties and accordingly, proceeded to determine whether or not the Agricultural Leasehold Contracts are valid.

GR NO. 132561

2005-06-30

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK v. CA

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Again in David v. Rivera,[27] this Court pointed out that the jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters is now expressly vested in the DAR through the DARAB.

GR NO. 139254

2005-03-18

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Orders Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. In the relatively recent case of Rivera v. Del Rosario,[21] this Court cited Section 1, Rule II, 2002 DARAB Rules of Procedure and reiterated that: The DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Again in David v. Rivera,[22] this Court pointed out that the jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters is now expressly vested in the DAR through the DARAB. Indeed, Section 50 of R.A. 6657 confers on the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) quasi-judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reform matters. In the process of reorganizing the DAR, Executive Order No. 129-A created the DARAB to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure enumerates the cases falling within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. In an earlier ruling rendered in the case of Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals,[23] reiterated in Morta, Sr. v. Occidental[24] and Heirs of the late Herman Rey Santos v. Court of Appeals,[25] this Court decreed: Section 1 of Executive Order No. 229 sets out the scope of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP); it states that the program

	GR No. 200903 2014-07-22	KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP v. JESSIE ROBREDO BRION, J.
The petitioners seem to have forgotten that a writ of prohibition only lies against the tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person's exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.[14] We issue a writ of prohibition to afford the aggrieved party a relief against the respondent's usurpation or grave abuse of jurisdiction or power.[15]
	GR No. 164632 2008-10-29	URETHANE TRADING SPECIALIST v. EDWIN ONG NACHURA, J.
Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the rule that the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is because a certiorari writ is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.[18] The appropriate course of action of the movant in such event is to file an answer[19] and interpose as affirmative defenses the objections raised in the motion to dismiss.[20] If, later, the decision of the trial judge is adverse, the movant may then elevate on appeal the same issues raised in the motion.[21]
	GR No. 175930-31 2008-02-11	NICOLAS v. SANDIGANBAYAN CARPIO MORALES, J.
On whether certiorari is the proper remedy in the consolidated petitions, the general rule prevailing is that it does not lie to review an order denying a demurrer to evidence, which is equivalent to a motion to dismiss, filed after the prosecution has presented its evidence and rested its case.[33]
	GR NO. 164934 2007-08-14	HEIRS OF FLORENCIO ADOLFO v. VICTORIA P. CABRAL QUISUMBING, J.
Specific and general provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657 and its implementing rules and procedure address the issue of jurisdiction. Section 50 of Rep. Act No. 6657 confers on the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) quasi-judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reform matters. In the process of reorganizing the DAR, Executive Order No. 129-A[25] created the DARAB to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform matters.[26]
	GR NO. 163980 2006-08-03	HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR TINGA, J.
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[21] Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.[22] Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.[23] Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners' allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
	GR NO. 157491 2006-06-20	SPS. PROCESO AMURAO AND MINERVA AMURAO v. SPS. JACINTO VILLALOBOS AND HERMINIGILDA VILLALOBOS CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In Teresita S. David v. Agustin Rivera,[23] this Court held that: [I]t is safe to conclude that the existence of prior agricultural tenancy relationship, if true, will divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction the previous juridical tie compels the characterization of the controversy as an "agrarian dispute." x x x Even if the tenurial arrangement has been severed, the action still involves an incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship. Where the case involves the dispossession by a former landlord of a former tenant of the land claimed to have been given as compensation in consideration of the renunciation of the tenurial rights, there clearly exists an agrarian dispute. On this point the Court has already ruled:Indeed, section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199, provides that 'all cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant ... shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.' This jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the relationship of landlord and tenant - at the time of the dispute. The same may have arisen, and often times arises, precisely from the previous termination of such relationship. If the same existed immediately, or shortly, before the controversy and the subject-matter thereof is whether or not said relationship has been lawfully terminated, or if the dispute springs or originates from the relationship of landlord and tenant, the litigation is (then) cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations . . . . In the case at bar, petitioners' claim that the tenancy relationship has been terminated by the Kasulatan is of no moment. As long as the subject matter of the dispute is the legality of the termination of the relationship, or if the dispute originates from such relationship, the case is cognizable by the DAR, through the DARAB. The severance of the tenurial arrangement will not render the action beyond the ambit of an agrarian dispute.[24]
	GR NO. 157307 2006-02-27	AGUSTIN RIVERA v. NEMESIO DAVID
First, on the matter of jurisdiction. We agree with petitioner that the DAR has jurisdiction over his case. In the 2004 case of David v. Rivera,[16] a case involving the same parcel of land here, filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mabalacat by the respondent against petitioner, the issue raised was whether the MCTC or the DAR had jurisdiction. Therein, we held that the existence of prior agricultural tenancy relationship characterizes the controversy as an "agrarian dispute", adding that"
	GR NO. 144652 2005-12-16	ARCADIO B. DANDOY v. ZACARIAS TONGSON AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
It must be emphasized that the complaint filed by petitioners is one for the declaration of nullity of the agricultural leasehold contracts. Petitioners' stance is that the contracts are not valid based primarily on the ground that respondents are not the lawful owners of the property subject of the contract. On the other hand, respondents contend that there exists a tenancy relationship between them and petitioners. Thus, the question whether or not there exists an agricultural tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondents arises. It is incumbent upon the trial court to first hear and receive evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not there was indeed a tenancy relationship. Thus, in David vs. Rivera,[20] the Court held that where the very issue determinative of the question of jurisdiction is the real relationship existing between the parties, it is necessary that evidence be first presented by the parties before the question of jurisdiction may be passed upon by the court. Once its existence is established, the trial court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.[21] But if it is shown that there was no tenancy relationship, then the trial court properly has jurisdiction over the case, and the next logical step is to determine whether the agricultural leasehold contracts are invalid. In this case, the RTC found no tenancy relationship between the parties and accordingly, proceeded to determine whether or not the Agricultural Leasehold Contracts are valid.
	GR NO. 132561 2005-06-30	PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK v. CA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Again in David v. Rivera,[27] this Court pointed out that the jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters is now expressly vested in the DAR through the DARAB.
	GR NO. 139254 2005-03-18	SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Orders Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. In the relatively recent case of Rivera v. Del Rosario,[21] this Court cited Section 1, Rule II, 2002 DARAB Rules of Procedure and reiterated that: The DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Again in David v. Rivera,[22] this Court pointed out that the jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters is now expressly vested in the DAR through the DARAB. Indeed, Section 50 of R.A. 6657 confers on the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) quasi-judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reform matters. In the process of reorganizing the DAR, Executive Order No. 129-A created the DARAB to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure enumerates the cases falling within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. In an earlier ruling rendered in the case of Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals,[23] reiterated in Morta, Sr. v. Occidental[24] and Heirs of the late Herman Rey Santos v. Court of Appeals,[25] this Court decreed: Section 1 of Executive Order No. 229 sets out the scope of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP); it states that the program

TERESITA S. DAVID v. AGUSTIN RIVERA