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GR No. 208566

2013-11-19

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.[133] The relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF- free budget for 2014."[134] The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners' claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar."[135] In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[136] the government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "[t]o prevent similar questions from re-emerging."[137] The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.

GR No. 208566

2013-11-19

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

In 1950, it has been documented[15] that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the areas of fund release and realignment to the area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress, they 'being the representatives of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local officials or civil leaders.'"[16] During this period, the pork barrel process commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislator's allocation, and the amount each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added their own provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President the Public Works Act.[17] In the 1960's, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the Senate.[18]

GR No. 183591

2008-10-14

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN

CARPIO MORALES, J.

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato[8] and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.[9] Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.[10]

GR No. 183591

2008-10-14

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN

CARPIO MORALES, J.

The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which right is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates were described as states or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of a nation-state in the modern sense.[34]

GR NO. 163980

2006-08-03

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR

TINGA, J.

[8] Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656, 665, citing IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 81.

GR NO. 171396

2006-05-03

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban's Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.[36] However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justice's very statement that an otherwise "moot" case may still be decided "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.

GR NO. 171396

2006-05-03

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[59] the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress have standing to sue, as they claim that the President's declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson.

GR NO. 171396

2006-05-03

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

The first provision pertains to the President's calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[111] this Court, through Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as follows:Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

GR NO. 171396

2006-05-03

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to "show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms." [5]

GR NO. 164978

2005-10-13

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL v. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA

CARPIO, J.

Petitioners, on the other hand, state that the Court can exercise its certiorari jurisdiction over unconstitutional acts of the President.[11] Petitioners further contend that they possess standing because President Arroyo's appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session impairs the powers of Congress. Petitioners cite Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary[12] as basis, thus:To the extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

	GR No. 208566 2013-11-19	GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.[133] The relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF- free budget for 2014."[134] The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners' claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar."[135] In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[136] the government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "[t]o prevent similar questions from re-emerging."[137] The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
	GR No. 208566 2013-11-19	GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In 1950, it has been documented[15] that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the areas of fund release and realignment to the area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress, they 'being the representatives of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local officials or civil leaders.'"[16] During this period, the pork barrel process commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislator's allocation, and the amount each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added their own provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President the Public Works Act.[17] In the 1960's, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the Senate.[18]
	GR No. 183591 2008-10-14	PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN CARPIO MORALES, J.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato[8] and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.[9] Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.[10]
	GR No. 183591 2008-10-14	PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN CARPIO MORALES, J.
The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which right is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates were described as states or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of a nation-state in the modern sense.[34]
	GR NO. 163980 2006-08-03	HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR TINGA, J.
[8] Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656, 665, citing IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
	GR NO. 171396 2006-05-03	PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban's Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.[36] However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justice's very statement that an otherwise "moot" case may still be decided "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.
	GR NO. 171396 2006-05-03	PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[59] the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress have standing to sue, as they claim that the President's declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson.
	GR NO. 171396 2006-05-03	PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The first provision pertains to the President's calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[111] this Court, through Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as follows:Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
	GR NO. 171396 2006-05-03	PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to "show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms." [5]
	GR NO. 164978 2005-10-13	AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL v. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA CARPIO, J.
Petitioners, on the other hand, state that the Court can exercise its certiorari jurisdiction over unconstitutional acts of the President.[11] Petitioners further contend that they possess standing because President Arroyo's appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session impairs the powers of Congress. Petitioners cite Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary[12] as basis, thus:To the extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

SANLAKAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO REYES