This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2011-05-31 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Petitioner's assertion that the complainants/witnesses against him have not been cross-examined by him, is likewise bereft of merit. While the right to cross-examine is a vital element of procedural due process, the right does not necessarily require an actual cross examination but merely an opportunity to exercise this right if desired by the party entitled to it.[27] In this case, while Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 provides that the sworn statements of witnesses shall take the place of oral testimony but shall be subject to cross-examination, petitioner missed this opportunity precisely because he did not appear at the deadline for the filing of his supplemental answer or counter-affidavit, and accordingly the hearing officer considered the case submitted for decision. And even with the grant of his subsequent motion to be furnished with copy of complaint and its annexes, he still failed to file a supplemental answer or counter-affidavit and instead filed a motion to dismiss reiterating the previous recommendation for dismissal made by Atty. Casugbo. Moreover, after the PNP Director General rendered his decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. He was also able to appeal from the decision of the PNP Director General to the DILG Secretary, and eventually to the CSC. We have held that the fact that a party filed motions for reconsideration and appeals with the tribunals below, in which she presented her arguments and through which she could have proffered her evidence, if any, negates her claim that she was denied opportunity to be heard.[28] | |||||
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2008-02-13 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Petitioners advance the issue that the receivership should not be recalled simply because the adverse party offers to post a counterbond. At the outset, we find that this issue was not raised before the CA and therefore proscribed by the doctrine that an issue raised for the first time on appeal and not timely raised in the proceedings in the lower court is barred by estoppel.[10] Even if we entertain the issue, the contention is nevertheless devoid of merit. The assailed CA decision supported the discharge of the receiver with several reasons including the posting of the counterbond. While the CA made a statement that the trial court should have discharged the appointed receiver on the basis of the proposed counterbond, such opinion does not jibe with the import of Sec. 3, Rule 59. The rule states that the "application may be denied or the receiver discharged." In statutory construction, the word "may" has always been construed as permissive. If the intent is to make it mandatory or ministerial for the trial court to order the recall of the receiver upon the offer to post a counterbond, then the court should have used the word "shall." Thus, the trial court has to consider the posting of the counterbond in addition to other reasons presented by the offeror why the receivership has to be set aside. | |||||
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2007-04-02 |
CORONA, J. |
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| While petitioner may argue that simple negligence does not warrant the award of moral damages, it nonetheless cannot insist that that was all it was guilty of. It refused to produce the original copy of the deposit slip which could have proven its claim that it did not receive respondents' missing check. Thus, in suppressing the best evidence that could have bolstered its claim and confirmed its innocence, the presumption now arises that it withheld the same for fraudulent purposes.[11] | |||||
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2005-12-09 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Notably, petitioners never raised these arguments during the proceedings before the RTC. Suffice it to say that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel.[16] Matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal where they are raised for the first time. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.[17] | |||||
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2005-10-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| There is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. The yardstick should be that it is not palpably and scandalously excessive.[21] We find the sum of P300,000.00 awarded by the lower courts excessive. In our view, the award of P100,000.00 as moral damages is reasonable and is in accord with our rulings in similar cases involving banks' negligence with regard to the accounts of their depositors.[22] | |||||
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2005-09-30 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| As to the prayer of Buenaventura, et al. for exemplary damages, the Court finds that the CA erred in deleting the award of exemplary damages. The law allows the grant of exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.[26] The business of a bank is affected with public interest; thus, it makes a sworn profession of diligence and meticulousness in giving irreproachable service.[27] For this reason, the bank should guard against injury attributable to negligence or bad faith on its part.[28] The award of exemplary damages is proper as a warning to BPI-FB and all concerned not to recklessly disregard their obligation to exercise the highest and strictest diligence in serving their depositors. However, the award should be in a reduced amount of P50,000.00 since exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.[29] | |||||
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2005-01-19 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| This is the very first time at this late stage that petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the trial court over this case. It did not do so before the trial court and the Appellate Court.[30] We have consistently ruled that an issue proffered for the first time on appeal and not timely presented in the proceedings before the lower court is barred by the principle of estoppel.[31] | |||||
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2004-11-23 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| In the present case, it cannot be said with certainty that Espino knows beyond doubt that Ocampo has not filed before any court or tribunal a separate case related to the present petition and the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 62410. In Loquias vs. Office of the Ombudsman,[16] we held that failure of one of the petitioners to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping constitutes a defect in the petition, which is a ground for dismissing the same. While we have held in rulings subsequent to Loquias that this rule may be relaxed, petitioners must comply with two conditions: first, petitioners must show justifiable cause for their failure to personally sign the certification and; second, they must also be able to prove that the outright dismissal of the petition would seriously impair the orderly administration of justice.[17] In the present case, we find that petitioners failed to prove the presence of these conditions. The dismissal by the Court of Appeals of CA-G.R. SP No. 62410 should have put petitioners on guard as to the basic procedural requirements in filing the petition. Notwithstanding such dismissal and their subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration, petitioners still failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the Rules by the failure of Ocampo to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping. In the present petition filed before us, PET PLANS once again failed to submit proof that it has authorized Espino to file the present petition or to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping attached thereto. Likewise, petitioner Ocampo again failed to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping. We cannot allow a party to gain an advantage from its flagrant disregard of the Rules.[18] We find this fatal to petitioners' cause. | |||||