This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2009-01-20 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Accused-appellant, on the other hand, could only offer denial and alibi as defenses. His alibi that he spent the afternoon drinking with other visitors does not deserve merit since he was present in the same house where the victim was. The copra dryer was only 150 meters away from the house. For alibi to prosper, the accused persons must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) their presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (2) the physical impossibility of their presence at the scene of the crime.[20] It should also be supported by the most convincing evidence since it is an inherently weak defense which can easily be fabricated.[21] Accused-appellant's alibi miserably fails the foregoing test. His only defense witness, his relative, Lolita, cannot consistently and convincingly assert that accused-appellant stayed in one place the whole afternoon. Lolita herself was busy entertaining other visitors while accused-appellant was outside the house. As found by the trial court:The testimony of Lolita Lagarde, aunt of the accused, Sergio Lagarde, claiming among others that since Sergio Lagarde arrived in her house, took his lunch at noontime and started drinking tuba at 1:00 x x x in the afternoon up to 8:00 x x x in the evening, and that, during that period, Sergio Lagarde did not leave the place, is of dubious veracity. Sergio Lagarde claimed that her auntie Lolita was drinking tuba at the upstairs of the house, together with Minggay Guipon, Esing Lagarde, Bandang Lar, June Biako, Lukas, Olay, Silay, including the accused and some others, however at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, because of the number of people who kept on coming upstairs, Lolita Lagarde requested the accused and his male drinking partners to transfer to the yard of her house, where they continued their drinking spree. Lolita Lagarde and her drinking partners remained drinking upstairs. She could not categorically say that the accused, Sergio Lagarde did not leave her place nor molested Mary Ann Guipon at around 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, when she, herself, was also busy drinking inside their house upstairs, separated by walls, from the place where Sergio Lagarde and his companions were drinking at the yard. It could only be surmised that Lolita Lagarde only concocted her testimony in favor of her nephew, Sergio Lagarde.[22] | |||||
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2008-11-26 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| This Court is not unmindful of the doctrine that for alibi to succeed as a defense, appellant must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.[85] | |||||
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2007-12-19 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. However, in order that alibi may succeed as a defense, "the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime."[78] | |||||
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2007-01-24 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| Since alibi can easily be fabricated or concocted, such allegation is always regarded with suspicion. For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense, and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.[52] "Physical impossibility" means that the accused "was at such other place [for] such a length of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the [crime scene], either before or after the time he was at such other place."[53] The trial court subsequently found that the appellant failed to prove this physical impossibility because the appellant's house where AAA resided could easily be reached within 30 minutes using a motorized banca from the fishpond of Gaudencio Jeves where he worked. Moreover, the positive identification of the appellant as the rapist prevails over the defense of alibi.[54] | |||||
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2006-02-13 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The pernicious consequences to both accused and offended party require that utmost care be taken in the review of a decision involving conviction of rape.[11] In such cases, we are guided by three principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[12] | |||||