This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2010-02-17 |
CORONA, J. |
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| The Court has already had the occasion to rule that an appointment remains valid in certain instances despite non-compliance of the proper officials with the pertinent CSC rules. In Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr.,[47] the CSC challenged the validity of the appointment of Ong on the ground that, among others, it was not reported in the July 1995 Report of Personnel Action (ROPA), thus making such appointment ineffective. The subject rule provided that an "appointment issued within the month but not listed in the ROPA for the said month shall become ineffective thirty days from issuance." Rejecting the CSC's contention, the Court held that there was a legitimate justification for such delayed observance of the rule: We find the respondent's justification for the failure of the POEA to include Ong's appointment in its ROPA for July 1995 as required by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1994 to be in order. The records show that the [Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)] did not include the contractual appointment of Ong in its July ROPA because its request for exemption from the educational requisite for confidential staff members provided in [Memorandum Circular] No. 38 had yet been resolved by the CSC. The resolution of the petitioner granting such request was received only in November, 1995. The POEA, thereafter, reported the appointment in its November, 1995 ROPA.[48] | |||||
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2010-02-17 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Not even the historical development of civil service laws can justify the retention of such restrictive provisions. Public Law No. 5,[31] the law formally establishing a civil service system, merely directed that all heads of offices notify the Philippine Civil Service Board "in writing without delay of all appointments x x x made in the classified service."[32] The Revised Administrative Code of 1917 was even less stringent as approval by the Director of the Civil Service of appointments of temporary and emergency employees was required only when practicable. Finally, Republic Act (RA) 2260[33] imposed no period within which appointments were attested to by local government treasurers to whom the CSC delegated its authority to act on personnel actions but provided that if within 180 days after receipt of said appointments, the CSC shall not have made any correction or revision, then such appointments shall be deemed to have been properly made. Consequently, it was only under PD 807 that submission of appointments for approval by the CSC was subjected to a 30-day period. That, however, has been lifted and abandoned by EO 292. | |||||
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2009-06-11 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| In Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr.,[26] we had the occasion to relax the rules on the reportorial requirement and put a stamp of validity on an appointment that was not included in the agency's ROPA within the time prescribed by the rules. In Joson, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) failed to include Priscilla Ong's appointment in its ROPA for July 1995. The records, however, showed that the agency failed to include her appointment because its request for exemption from the educational requisite for confidential staff members was yet to be resolved by the CSC. In view thereof, we found the non-compliance with the rules justified, and insufficient to invalidate an appointment. | |||||
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2008-12-18 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Suffice it to mention that a de facto officer is one who is in possession of the office and is discharging its duties under color of authority, and by color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.[44] If a person appointed to an office is subsequently declared ineligible therefor, his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that will confer on him the status of a de facto officer.[45] | |||||
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2007-08-14 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Thus, to be entitled to initial compensation, said appointees must prove that they were issued appointments and have assumed the position to which they were appointed.[36] The best evidence of this would be the copies of their appointments duly issued in accordance with Section 4,[37] Rule IV of the CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointments and other Personnel Actions (Omnibus Rules on Appointment) and transmitted to the CSC for attestation[38] and the certificates of their assumption of office and their daily time records or service records. | |||||
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2007-04-27 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| No Cooperative shall borrow money from any source without the Board of Administrator's prior approval: Provided, That the NEA Board of Administrators, may, by appropriate rule or regulation, grant general permission to Cooperative to secure short-term loans not requiring the encumbrance of their real properties or of a substantial portion of their other properties or assets. It is a fundamental rule in statutory construction that the clauses, phrases, sections and provisions of a law be read as a whole; never as disjointed or truncated parts,[16] for a law is enacted as a single entity and not by installment of paragraphs here and subsections there.[17] Applying this rule to Section 10, its opening paragraph must be read in relation to the succeeding subsections. The phrase in the opening paragraph ostensibly vesting in the NEA jurisdiction over "all matters" involving electric cooperatives actually pertain to the subjects covered in the succeeding subsections such as the organization of electric cooperatives,[18] rate fixing,[19] loan agreements and fund management. This is a rational understanding of Section 10 for, as specified in the preamble of the law, the primary purpose of the NEA is to ensure total electrification through the administration of funds for the establishment and operation of electric cooperatives. | |||||
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2007-04-04 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| The law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in relation to the whole law. It is [a] cardinal rule in statutory construction that a statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with other parts of the statute and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.[49] | |||||