This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2014-11-12 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation[16] that: As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2014-08-27 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In all then, PAL has presented in context a clear statutory basis for its refund claim of excise tax, a claim predicated on a statutory grant of exemption from that forced exaction. It thus behooves the government to refund what it erroneously collected. To borrow from CIR v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation,[17] if the state expects taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, it must hold itself against the same standard in refunding erroneous exactions and payment of such taxes. | |||||
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2013-09-11 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| For sure, the CTA cannot, as the Commissioner argues, be faulted for denying petitioner FTC's Motion for Additional Writ of Execution filed in CTA Case Nos. 6365, 6383 and 6612 and for denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for it has no power nor authority to deviate from the wording of the dispositive portion of Our July 21, 2008 Decision in G.R. Nos. 167274-75. To reiterate, the CTA simply followed the all too familiar doctrine that "when there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision."[15] Veering away from the fallo might even be viewed as irregular and may give rise to a charge of breach of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Nevertheless, it behooves this Court for reasons articulated earlier to grant relief to petitioner FTC by way of clarifying Our July 21, 2008 Decision. This corrective step constitutes, in the final analysis, a continuation of the proceedings in G.R. Case Nos. 167274-75. And it is the right thing to do under the premises. If the BIR, or other government taxing agencies for that matter, expects taxpayers to observe fairness, honesty, transparency and accountability in paying their taxes, it must, to borrow from BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v Court of Appeals[16] hold itself against the same standard in refunding excess payments or illegal exactions. As a necessary corollary, when the taxpayer's entitlement to a refund stands undisputed, the State should not misuse technicalities and legalisms, however exalted, to keep money not belonging to it.[17] As we stressed in G.R. Nos. 167274-75, the government is not exempt from the application of solutio indebiti, a basic postulate proscribing one, including the State, from enriching himself or herself at the expense of another.[18] So it must be here. | |||||
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2011-11-23 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Respondent, for its part, maintains the correctness of the CTA's interpretation and stresses that as already held by this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation,[14] the last paragraph of Section 1 of Revenue Regulations No. 17-99 finds no support in the clear and plain wording of Section 143 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997. | |||||
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2011-09-28 |
BRION, J. |
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| Except for the tax period and the amounts involved,[14] the case at bar presents the same issue that the Court already resolved in 2008 in CIR v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation.[15] In the 2008 Fortune Tobacco case, the Court upheld the tax refund claims of Fortune Tobacco after finding invalid the proviso in Section 1 of RR 17-99. We ruled: Section 145 states that during the transition period, i.e., within the next three (3) years from the effectivity of the Tax Code, the excise tax from any brand of cigarettes shall not be lower than the tax due from each brand on 1 October 1996. This qualification, however, is conspicuously absent as regards the 12% increase which is to be applied on cigars and cigarettes packed by machine, among others, effective on 1 January 2000. Clearly and unmistakably, Section 145 mandates a new rate of excise tax for cigarettes packed by machine due to the 12% increase effective on 1 January 2000 without regard to whether the revenue collection starting from this period may turn out to be lower than that collected prior to this date. | |||||
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2008-09-12 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The divergent factual findings and rulings of the CTA and CA impel us to evaluate the evidence adduced below, particularly the April 14, 1998 OR 0189 in the amount of PhP 135,996,570 [for US$ 5,190,000 at US$1: PhP 26.203 rate of exchange]. Verily, a claim for tax refund may be based on a statute granting tax exemption, or, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation[12] would have it, the result of legislative grace. In such case, the claim is to be construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer,[13] meaning that the claim cannot be made to rest on vague inference. Where the rule of strict interpretation against the taxpayer is applicable as the claim for refund partakes of the nature of an exemption, the claimant must show that he clearly falls under the exempting statute. On the other hand, a tax refund may be, as usually it is, predicated on tax refund provisions allowing a refund of erroneous or excess payment of tax. The return of what was erroneously paid is founded on the principle of solutio indebiti, a basic postulate that no one should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. The caveat against unjust enrichment covers the government.[14] And as decisional law teaches, a claim for tax refund proper, as here, necessitates only the preponderance-of-evidence threshold like in any ordinary civil case.[15] | |||||