This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2008-04-18 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| According to this Court's ruling in Argana v. Republic,[56] as applied to a judgment based on compromise, both the 60-day and six-month reglementary periods within which to file a petition for relief should be reckoned from the date when the decision approving the compromise agreement was rendered because such judgment is considered immediately executory and entered on the date that it was approved by the court. In the present case, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City granting the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties in Civil Case No. 66213 was issued on 30 April 1999, yet AEDC only spoke of the alleged fraud which vitiated its consent thereto in its Petition before this Court filed on 20 October 2005, more than six years later. | |||||
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2006-06-27 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| A special civil action for certiorari may be instituted when any tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[11] To recall, in the present case, the RTC of Makati City had already rendered its original judgment in Civil Case No 91-3090 and the same was appealed to the CA. Acting on the appeal, the CA reversed the judgment of the RTC of Makati City and dismissed the respondents' complaint for consignation. The CA decision became final and executory. Subsequently, the respondents filed the motion to withdraw deposit with the RTC of Makati City and which the latter denied in the Orders of July 31, 2000 and December 14, 2000. These orders, issued after the original judgment had already been rendered, were interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable. Since no appeal was available against such orders, the respondents properly availed of the remedy of certiorari before the CA. | |||||
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2005-09-30 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Significantly, Ombudsman Marcelo did not state in the said memorandum the reason for his inhibition. On this point, the rule on voluntary inhibition of judges finds application to the Ombudsman in the performance of his functions particularly in administrative proceedings like OMB-C-A-03-0379-J. Like judges, the decision on whether or not to inhibit is admittedly left to the Ombudsman's sound discretion and conscience.[23] However, again similar to judges, Ombudsman Marcelo has no unfettered discretion to inhibit himself. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes.[24] No such cause was proffered by Ombudsman Marcelo for his inhibition in OMB-C-A-03-0379-J. | |||||