This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2011-06-15 |
BRION, J. |
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| What is strikingly significant is that even the petitioner's own testimony merely attempted to confirm his actual possession of the disputed property, without, however, supporting his claim - contrary to the written Agreement - that the parties' ownership of the subject property would be co-extensive with their possession. This is the core of the petitioner's defense. At any rate, just as non-possession does not negate ownership, neither does possession automatically prove ownership, [48] especially in the face of an unambiguous document executed by the parties themselves. | |||||
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2008-09-12 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| On the second issue, it is settled that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. [29] | |||||
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2007-04-24 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[24] A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when, among other things, the applicant, not explicitly exempted, files with the court, where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.[25] Thus, the posting of a bond is a condition sine qua non for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued. | |||||
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2007-03-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| An injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive right or interest; it is not a cause of action by itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main suit.[25] The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case is heard fully.[26] | |||||
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2007-02-19 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The plaintiff praying for a writ of preliminary injunction must further establish that he or she has a present and unmistakable right to be protected; that the facts against which injunction is directed violate such right;[59] and there is a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damages. In the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified. Thus, where the plaintiff's right is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction.[60] | |||||
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2006-06-20 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| In the issuance of a writ of possession, no discretion is left to the trial court. Any question regarding the cancellation of the writ or in respect of the validity and regularity of the public sale should be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No. 3135.[27] Perforce, the writ of possession issued in LRC Case No. 99-065 is in order, and the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 260, erred in issuing its Order dated August 17, 1999, enjoining its implementation. As the Court stated in Medina v. Greenfield Development Corporation:[28] Equally pertinent is the rule that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction, which in effect, would dispose of the main case without trial. The ground relied upon by the trial court in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction in this case is its doubt over the acquisition of the properties by respondent. Such basis would be virtually recognizing petitioners' claim that the deeds of conveyances and the titles are a nullity without further proof, to the detriment of the doctrine of presumption of validity in favor of these documents. There would, in effect, be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the proposition which the petitioners are inceptively duty bound to prove. To emphasize, any reference to the presumptive validity of the notarized documents in this case is merely preliminary. Petitioner still has in his favor the opportunity to refute such presumption and disprove the authenticity of the documents and deeds, which were the bases for the issuance of the writ of possession, in Civil Case No. 99-0272. | |||||