This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2007-02-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner likewise invokes Marcelo v. Court of Appeals[7] where this Court declared:Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court. The Court is unconvinced. | |||||
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2006-01-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| By his failures, respondent violated Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge should dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. They equally demonstrate his lack of dedication to his work. Respondent should be reminded that his assumption of judicial office casts upon him duties and restrictions peculiar to his position. The court exists to promote justice and to attain this, a judge should organize his court with a view of prompt and convenient dispatch of business, be punctual in the performance of his duties, exhibit an industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed upon him and be prompt in disposing all matters submitted to him. [29] Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. [30] | |||||
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2005-04-26 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| It is not uncommon for this Court, upon proper application and in meritorious cases, especially when difficult questions of law or complex issues are involved, to grant judges of lower courts additional time to decide beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge really needs to do, in cases of great difficulty, is to request for an extension of time over which the Court has, almost invariably, been sympathetic.[23] In this case, we note that Judge Echavez did not request for an extension. | |||||