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PABLO D. ACAYLAR v. DANILO G. HARAYO

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 205250 2013-03-18	LORRAINE D. BARRA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BRION, J.
The petitioner's failure to state the date of receipt of the copy of the October 10, 2011 CSC decision is not fatal to her case since the dates are evident from the records. Besides, we have ruled that the more important material date which must be duly alleged in the petition is the date of receipt of the resolution of denial of the motion for reconsideration, which the petitioner has duly complied with.[7]
	GR No. 174158 2011-06-27	WILLIAM ENDELISEO BARROGA v. DATA CENTER COLLEGE OF PHILIPPINES DEL CASTILLO, J.
The three material dates which should be stated in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are the dates when the notice of the judgment was received, when a motion for reconsideration was filed and when the notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration was received. [26] These dates should be reflected in the petition to enable the reviewing court to determine if the petition was filed on time. [27] Indeed, petitioner's petition before the CA stated only the date of his receipt of the NLRC's Resolution denying his motion for partial reconsideration. It failed to state when petitioner received the assailed NLRC Decision and when he filed his partial motion for reconsideration. However, this omission is not at all fatal because these material dates are reflected in petitioner's Partial Motion for Reconsideration attached as Annex "N" of the petition. In Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo, [28] we held that failure to state these two dates in the petition may be excused if the same are evident from the records of the case. It was further ruled by this Court that the more important material date which must be duly alleged in the petition is the date of receipt of the resolution of denial of the motion for reconsideration. In the case at bar, petitioner has duly complied with this rule.
	GR No. 182953 2010-10-11	CORAZON D. SARMIENTA v. MANALITE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Likewise, the evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property, MAHA tolerated petitioners' stay and gave them the option to acquire portions of the property by becoming members of MAHA. Petitioners' continued stay on the premises was subject to the condition that they shall comply with the requirements of the CMP. Thus, when they failed to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate the property as their right of possession had already expired or had been terminated. The moment MAHA required petitioners to leave, petitioners became deforciants illegally occupying the land.[23] Well settled is the rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.[24] Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled in favor of MAHA.
	GR No. 170864 2010-02-16	NELSON LAGAZO v. GERALD B. SORIANO PERALTA, J.
Prior physical possession is an indispensable element in forcible entry cases.[6] Thus, the ultimate question here is who had prior physical possession of the disputed land.
	GR NO. 165793 2006-10-27	ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO v. CA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally, the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as attorney's fees and legal costs. SO ORDERED.[6] After the trial court promulgated its decision, respondents appealed the same to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76995. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals in a notice dated October 3, 2003 required respondents to file their appellant's brief.