This case has been cited 10 times or more.
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2014-12-10 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| The 15-day reglementary period has been upheld by this court in a long line of cases.[80] In AMA Computer College-Santiago City, Inc. v. Nacino,[81] Nippon Paint Employees Union-OLALIA v. Court of Appeals,[82] Manila Midtown Hotel v. Borromeo,[83] and Sevilla Trading Company v. Semana,[84] this court denied petitioners' petitions for review on certiorari since petitioners failed to appeal the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision within the 15-day reglementary period under Rule 43. In these cases, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal assailing the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision. | |||||
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2014-06-18 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| With regard to the length of time the company practice should have been observed to constitute a voluntary employer practice that cannot be unilaterally reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer, we find that jurisprudence has not laid down any rule requiring a specific minimum number of years. In Davao Fruits Corporation v. Associated Labor Unions,[14] the company practice lasted for six years. In Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services v. Abarquez,[15] the employer, for three years and nine months, approved the commutation to cash of the un enjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits of its intermittent workers. In Tiangco v. Leogardo, Jr.,[16] the employer carried on the practice of giving a fixed monthly emergency allowance from November 1976 to February 1980, or three years and four months. In Sevilla Trading Company v. Semana,[17] the employer kept the practice of including non-basic benefits such as paid leaves for unused sick leave and vacation in the computation of their 13th-month pay for at least two years. | |||||
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2013-06-03 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Pursuant to Article 100 of the Labor Code, petitioner as the employer could not reduce, diminish, discontinue or eliminate any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by or granted to its employees. This prohibition against the diminution of benefits is founded on the constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare and to afford labor full protection.[29] The application of the prohibition against the diminution of benefits presupposes that a company practice, policy or tradition favorable to the employees has been clearly established; and that the payments made by the employer pursuant to the practice, policy, or tradition have ripened into benefits enjoyed by them.[30] To be considered as a practice, policy or tradition, however, the giving of the benefits should have been done over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate.[31] It is relevant to mention that we have not yet settled on the specific minimum number of years as the length of time sufficient to ripen the practice, policy or tradition into a benefit that the employer cannot unilaterally withdraw.[32] | |||||
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2009-06-18 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| With regard to the length of time the company practice should have been exercised to constitute voluntary employer practice which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn by the employer, jurisprudence has not laid down any hard and fast rule. In the case of Davao Fruits Corporation v. Associated Labor Unions,[19] the company practice of including in the computation of the 13th-month pay the maternity leave pay and cash equivalent of unused vacation and sick leave lasted for six (6) years. In another case, Tiangco v. Leogardo, Jr.,[20] the employer carried on the practice of giving a fixed monthly emergency allowance from November 1976 to February 1980, or three (3) years and four (4) months. While in Sevilla Trading v. Semana,[21] the employer kept the practice of including non-basic benefits such as paid leaves for unused sick leave and vacation leave in the computation of their 13th-month pay for at least two (2) years. In all these cases, this Court held that the grant of these benefits has ripened into company practice or policy which cannot be peremptorily withdrawn. The common denominator in these cases appears to be the regularity and deliberateness of the grant of benefits over a significant period of time. | |||||
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2008-05-14 |
TINGA, J, |
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| Any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer.[14] The principle of non-diminution of benefits is founded on the Constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,"[15] and "to afford labor full protection."[16] Said mandate in turn is the basis of Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be rendered in favor of labor." Jurisprudence is replete with cases which recognize the right of employees to benefits which were voluntarily given by the employer and which ripened into company practice. Thus in DavaoFruits Corporation v. Associated Labor Unions, et al.[17]where an employer had freely and continuously included in the computation of the 13th month pay those items that were expressly excluded by the law, we held that the act which was favorable to the employees though not conforming to law had thus ripened into a practice and could not be withdrawn, reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated. In Sevilla Trading Company v. Semana,[18] we ruled that the employer's act of including non-basic benefits in the computation of the 13th month pay was a voluntary act and had ripened into a company practice which cannot be peremptorily withdrawn. Meanwhile in Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services v. Abarquez,[19] the Court ordered the payment of the cash equivalent of the unenjoyed sick leave benefits to its intermittent workers after finding that said workers had received these benefits for almost four years until the grant was stopped due to a different interpretation of the CBA provisions. We held that the employer cannot unilaterally withdraw the existing privilege of commutation or conversion to cash given to said workers, and as also noted that the employer had in fact granted and paid said cash equivalent of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave benefits to some intermittent workers. | |||||
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2008-02-11 |
CORONA, J. |
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| SECTION 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act Number 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. (Emphasis supplied) This rule was cited in Sevilla Trading Company v. Semana,[13] Manila Midtown Hotel v. Borromeo,[14] and Nippon Paint Employees Union-Olalia v. Court of Appeals.[15] These cases held that the proper remedy from the adverse decision of a voluntary arbitrator, if errors of fact and/or law are raised, is a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Thus, petitioner's contention that it may avail of a petition for review under Rule 43 under the circumstances of this case is correct. | |||||
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2008-02-04 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| A petition for certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, especially if such was occasioned by one's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.[11] Though there are instances where the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal, we find no compelling reasons for relaxing the rule in this case, as the issues set forth clearly pertain to the wisdom and soundness of the assailed decision. | |||||
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2006-02-22 |
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| Petitioners assail the 21 May 2001 Decision and the 15 March 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari. For a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 to issue, petitioners must show that they have no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against their perceived grievance.[8] Certiorari cannot be a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available.[9] In A.F. Sanchez Brokerage, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court explained:In another vein, the rule is well settled that in a petition for certiorari, the petitioner must prove not merely reversible error but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. | |||||
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2005-07-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In herein case, the Decision of the Panel was in the form of a dismissal of petitioner's complaint. Naturally, this dismissal was contained in the main decision and not in the dissenting opinion. Thus, under Section 6, Rule VII of the same guidelines implementing Article 262-A of the Labor Code, this Decision, as a matter of course, would become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of copies of the decision by the parties even without receipt of the dissenting opinion unless, in the meantime, a motion for reconsideration[5] or a petition for review to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court[6] is filed within the same 10-day period. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, a dissenting opinion is not binding on the parties as it is a mere expression of the individual view of the dissenting member from the conclusion held by the majority of the Court, following our ruling in Garcia v. Perez[7] as reiterated in National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries v. NLRC.[8] | |||||
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2005-06-15 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The case of Davao Fruits Corporation v. Associated Labor Unions, et al.[23] presented an example of a voluntary act of the employer that has ripened into a company practice. In that case, the employer, from 1975 to 1981, freely and continuously included in the computation of the 13th month pay those items that were expressly excluded by the law. We have held that this act, which was favorable to the employees though not conforming to law, has ripened into a practice and therefore can no longer be withdrawn, reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated. Furthermore, in Sevilla Trading Company v. Semana,[24] we stated:With regard to the length of time the company practice should have been exercised to constitute voluntary employer practice which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn by the employer, we hold that jurisprudence has not laid down any rule requiring a specific minimum number of years. In the above quoted case of Davao Fruits Corporation vs. Associated Labor Unions, the company practice lasted for six (6) years. In another case, Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services vs. Abarquez, the employer, for three (3) years and nine (9) months, approved the commutation to cash of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits of its intermittent workers. While in Tiangco vs. Leogardo, Jr. the employer carried on the practice of giving a fixed monthly emergency allowance from November 1976 to February 1980, or three (3) years and four (4) months. In all these cases, this Court held that the grant of these benefits has ripened into company practice or policy which cannot be peremptorily withdrawn. In the case at bar, petitioner Sevilla Trading kept the practice of including non-basic benefits such as paid leaves for unused sick leave and vacation leave in the computation of their 13th-month pay for at least two (2) years. This, we rule likewise constitutes voluntary employer practice which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn by the employer without violating Art. 100 of the Labor Code.[25] (Emphasis supplied) | |||||