This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2010-09-15 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office.[18] Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al..,[19] where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that: The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender - that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x | |||||
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2009-06-05 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In ascertaining whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the following factors must be considered: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.[11] The right to a speedy disposition of cases is considered violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.[12] A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient.[13] In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to a speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.[14] | |||||
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2004-10-18 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| The right to speedy disposition of cases, like the right to speedy trial, is violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.[4] In the determination of whether said right has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.[5] The conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant, the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay are the factors to consider and balance.[6] A mere mathematical reckoning of time involved would not be sufficient.[7] | |||||
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2004-10-18 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, the cases against petitioner remained dormant for almost three years. In ruling that the long delay violated not only Tatad's constitutional right to due process but also his right to speedy disposition of the cases against him, the Court considered three factors. First, political motivation played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process. Second, there was a blatant departure from established procedures prescribed by law for the conduct of a preliminary investigation. And third, the long delay in resolving the preliminary investigation could not be justified on the basis of the records.[17] | |||||