This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2013-10-09 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Clearly, the Petition for Custody and the Petition for Protection Order have the same parties who represent the same interests. The fact that Ava and Ara, who are parties in the Petition for Protection Order, are not impleaded in the Petition for Custody is of no moment because they are precisely the very subjects of the Petition for Custody and their respective rights are represented by their mother, Michelle. In a long line of cases on forum shopping, the Court has held that absolute identity of the parties is not required, it being enough that there is substantial identity of the parties[40] or at least such parties represent the same interests in both actions. It does not matter, as here, that in the Petition for Custody, Juan Ignacio is the petitioner and Michelle is the respondent while in the Petition for Protection Order, their roles are reversed. That a party is the petitioner in one case and at the same time, the respondent in the other case does not, without more, remove the said cases from the ambit of the rules on forum shopping. So did the Court hold, for example in First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, that forum shopping exists even in cases like this where petitioners or plaintiffs in one case were impleaded as respondents or defendants in another.[41] Moreover, this Court has constantly held that the fact that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case or vice versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.[42] | |||||
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2008-08-06 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The CA appears to have overlooked the principle that what is required is only substantial, and not absolute, identity of parties. There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case.[26] Moreover, the fact that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case, or vice versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.[27] | |||||
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2006-10-16 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.[26] In the case at bar, in Criminal Cases No. 26168 to 71 only the responsible officers of the petitioner are charged in the Information, while in Civil Case No. 02-102650, it is only the corporation that is impleaded, holding it liable for the unpaid customs duties and taxes as a corporate taxpayer. Taxes being personal to the taxpayer, it can only be enforced against herein petitioner because the payment of unpaid customs duties and taxes are the personal obligation of the petitioner as a corporate taxpayer, thus, it cannot be imposed on its corporate officers, much so on its individual stockholders, for this will violate the principle that a corporation has personality separate and distinct from the persons constituting it.[27] Having said that, the parties in the two actions are entirely different, hence, petitioner failed to establish the first requisite of litis pendentia as to identity of parties. | |||||