Lawyerly

GR No. 198140

2016-01-25

ERWIN L. MAGCAMIT v. INTERNAL AFFAIRS SERVICE - PDEA

BRION, J.

Claiming that he was not involved in the extortion, Magcamit argues that the CSC and the CA misappreciated the facts when they considered the affidavit of complaint CI Paner executed on May 7, 2008, as substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that he conspired with his co-agents. This issue involves a question of fact as there is need for a calibration of the evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses and the existence and the relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to one another and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.[14]

GR No. 186332

2013-10-23

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK v. SPS. ERNESTO LOPEZ AND FLORENTINA LOPEZ

BRION, J.

A parallel situation prevails in the present case. Almost 29 years have elapsed since the filing of the complaint in 1984. The amount of the principal loan already ballooned to an exorbitant amount unwarranted in fact and in operation. While the Court recognizes the right of the parties to enter into contracts, this rule is not absolute. We are allowed to temper interest rates when necessary. We have thus ruled in several cases that when the agreed rate is iniquitous, it is considered as contrary to morals, if not against the law. Such stipulation is void.[46]

GR No. 194781

2012-06-27

RGM INDUSTRIES v. UNITED PACIFIC CAPITAL CORPORATION

REYES, J.

The issue on partial payments and their application to the outstanding balance involves a calibration of the evidence presented, hence, factual in nature and not reviewable in the petition at bar. Oft-repeated is the rule that petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court may be brought only on questions of law, not on questions of fact.[9]

GR No. 175490

2009-09-17

ILEANA DR. MACALINAO v. BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

VELASCO JR., J.

Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there was no express contract thereon. Hence, courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand.[18]

GR No. 171035

2009-08-24

WILLIAM ONG GENATO v. BENJAMIN BAYHON

PUNO, C.J.

We now go to the interest awarded by the trial court. We note that the interest has been pegged at 5% per month, or 60% per annum. This is unconscionable, hence cannot be enforced.[29] In light of this, the rate of interest for this kind of loan transaction has been fixed in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals,[30] at 12% per annum, calculated from October 3, 1989, the date of extrajudicial demand.[31]

GR No. 171035

2009-07-24

WILLIAM ONG GENATO v. BENJAMIN BAYHON

We now go to the interest awarded by the trial court. We note that the interest has been pegged at 5% per month, or 60% per annum. This is unconscionable, hence cannot be enforced.[29] In light of this, the rate of interest for this kind of loan transaction has been fixed in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals,[30] at 12% per annum, calculated from October 3, 1989, the date of extrajudicial demand.[31]

GR Nos. 169408 & 170144

2008-04-30

HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES v. DYNAMIC PLANNERS

VELASCO JR., J.

This issue involves a question of fact. Such question exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts; and when there is need for a calibration of the evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses and the existence and the relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.[28] (Emphasis supplied.)

GR No. 171184

2008-03-04

BENJAMIN P. QUITORIANO for himself and in behalf of the other successors-in-interest of the intestate estate of the late NICOLAS QUITORIANO v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD and EDUARDO AGLIBOT

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The claim [of] [therein] petitioner Emiliano Rabina that the subject landholding was not really owned by the Rabina family but by the Quitoriano family and that there was false representation by [private] respondent Aglibot that the land is owned by the Rabina family[;] hence, he sold the subject landholding to [private respondent] Aglibot could not be admitted by the Board. The Board could not accept the claim of false representation by Emiliano Rabina. It is hard to imagine that Emiliano Rabina who is a government prosecutor could be misled by his tenant, [private] respondent Aglibot. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that Fiscal Emiliano Rabina could not identify the boundaries of his properties.[17] It is thus beyond this Court's jurisdiction to review the factual finding of the Provincial Adjudicator, DARAB and the Court of Appeals that no fraud or misrepresentation attended the execution of the Deed of Absolute Transfer. Whether the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by an adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing, whether certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side, whether inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight, all these are issues of fact which may not be passed upon in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[18] The Court is not a trier of facts.[19] It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence.[20] The jurisdiction of this Court over cases brought to it is limited to the review and rectification of errors allegedly committed by the lower courts.[21] The recognized exceptions are not here present.[22] Hence, the general rule holds true in the present Petition.

GR NO. 171048

2007-07-31

RUDY A. PALECPEC v. CORAZON C. DAVIS IN HER CAPACITY AS REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

PER CURIAM

But when is the Court faced with a question of law? We have differentiated a question of law from a question of fact, thus, "[t]here is a question of law when doubts or differences arise as to what law pertains to a certain state of facts, and a question of fact when the doubt pertains to the truth or falsity of alleged facts."[25] A question of fact arises when "there is need for a calibration of the evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses and the existence and the relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation."[26]

GR NO. 145871

2006-01-31

LEONIDES C. DIÑO v. LINA JARDINES

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

In the case at bar, the stipulated interest rate is 6% per month, or 72% per annum. By the standards set in the above-cited cases, this stipulation is similarly invalid. x x x.[18] Applying the afore-cited rulings to the instant case, the inescapable conclusion is that the agreed interest rate of 9% per month or 108% per annum, as claimed by respondent; or 10% per month or 120% per annum, as claimed by petitioner, is clearly excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. Although respondent admitted that she agreed to the interest rate of 9%, which she believed was exorbitant, she explained that she was constrained to do so as she was badly in need of money at that time. As declared in the Medel case[19] and Imperial vs. Jaucian,[20] "[i]niquitous and unconscionable stipulations on interest rates, penalties and attorney's fees are contrary to morals." Thus, in the present case, the rate of interest being charged on the principal loan of P165,000.00, be it 9% or 10% per month, is void. The CA correctly reduced the exhorbitant rate to "legal interest."

GR NOS. 150773 & 153599

2005-09-30

SPS. DAVID B. CARPO AND RECHILDA S. CARPO v. ELEANOR CHUA

TINGA, J.

In a long line of cases, this Court has invalidated similar stipulations on interest rates for being excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. In Solangon v. Salazar,[10] we annulled the stipulation of 6% per month or 72% per annum interest on a P60,000.00 loan. In Imperial v. Jaucian,[11] we reduced the interest rate from 16% to 1.167% per month or 14% per annum. In Ruiz v. Court of Appeals,[12] we equitably reduced the agreed 3% per month or 36% per annum interest to 1% per month or 12% per annum interest. The 10% and 8% interest rates per month on a P1,000,000.00 loan were reduced to 12% per annum in Cuaton v. Salud.[13] Recently, this Court, in Arrofo v. Quino,[14] reduced the 7% interest per month on a P15,000.00 loan amounting to 84% interest per annum to 18% per annum.

GR No. 145794

2005-01-26

LOURDES S. ARROFO v. PEDRO QUIÑO

CARPIO, J.

reduce this interest rate to 18% per annum.[36] WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM with modification the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 16 October 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53733. Respondent Pedro Quiño shall pay 18% interest per annum on his

GR No. 148753

2004-07-30

NEW SAMPAGUITA BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

PANGANIBAN, J.

"While the Usury Law[32] ceiling on interest rates was lifted by [Central Bank] Circular No. 905,[33] nothing in the said Circular grants lenders carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets."[34] In fact, we have declared nearly ten years ago that neither this Circular nor PD 1684, which further amended the Usury Law, "authorized either party to unilaterally raise the interest rate without the other's consent."[35]

	GR No. 198140 2016-01-25	ERWIN L. MAGCAMIT v. INTERNAL AFFAIRS SERVICE - PDEA BRION, J.
Claiming that he was not involved in the extortion, Magcamit argues that the CSC and the CA misappreciated the facts when they considered the affidavit of complaint CI Paner executed on May 7, 2008, as substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that he conspired with his co-agents. This issue involves a question of fact as there is need for a calibration of the evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses and the existence and the relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to one another and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.[14]
	GR No. 186332 2013-10-23	PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK v. SPS. ERNESTO LOPEZ AND FLORENTINA LOPEZ BRION, J.
A parallel situation prevails in the present case. Almost 29 years have elapsed since the filing of the complaint in 1984. The amount of the principal loan already ballooned to an exorbitant amount unwarranted in fact and in operation. While the Court recognizes the right of the parties to enter into contracts, this rule is not absolute. We are allowed to temper interest rates when necessary. We have thus ruled in several cases that when the agreed rate is iniquitous, it is considered as contrary to morals, if not against the law. Such stipulation is void.[46]
	GR No. 194781 2012-06-27	RGM INDUSTRIES v. UNITED PACIFIC CAPITAL CORPORATION REYES, J.
The issue on partial payments and their application to the outstanding balance involves a calibration of the evidence presented, hence, factual in nature and not reviewable in the petition at bar. Oft-repeated is the rule that petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court may be brought only on questions of law, not on questions of fact.[9]
	GR No. 175490 2009-09-17	ILEANA DR. MACALINAO v. BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VELASCO JR., J.
Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there was no express contract thereon. Hence, courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand.[18]
	GR No. 171035 2009-08-24	WILLIAM ONG GENATO v. BENJAMIN BAYHON PUNO, C.J.
We now go to the interest awarded by the trial court. We note that the interest has been pegged at 5% per month, or 60% per annum. This is unconscionable, hence cannot be enforced.[29] In light of this, the rate of interest for this kind of loan transaction has been fixed in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals,[30] at 12% per annum, calculated from October 3, 1989, the date of extrajudicial demand.[31]
	GR No. 171035 2009-07-24	WILLIAM ONG GENATO v. BENJAMIN BAYHON
We now go to the interest awarded by the trial court. We note that the interest has been pegged at 5% per month, or 60% per annum. This is unconscionable, hence cannot be enforced.[29] In light of this, the rate of interest for this kind of loan transaction has been fixed in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals,[30] at 12% per annum, calculated from October 3, 1989, the date of extrajudicial demand.[31]
	GR Nos. 169408 & 170144 2008-04-30	HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES v. DYNAMIC PLANNERS VELASCO JR., J.
This issue involves a question of fact. Such question exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts; and when there is need for a calibration of the evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses and the existence and the relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.[28] (Emphasis supplied.)
	GR No. 171184 2008-03-04	BENJAMIN P. QUITORIANO for himself and in behalf of the other successors-in-interest of the intestate estate of the late NICOLAS QUITORIANO v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD and EDUARDO AGLIBOT CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The claim [of] [therein] petitioner Emiliano Rabina that the subject landholding was not really owned by the Rabina family but by the Quitoriano family and that there was false representation by [private] respondent Aglibot that the land is owned by the Rabina family[;] hence, he sold the subject landholding to [private respondent] Aglibot could not be admitted by the Board. The Board could not accept the claim of false representation by Emiliano Rabina. It is hard to imagine that Emiliano Rabina who is a government prosecutor could be misled by his tenant, [private] respondent Aglibot. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that Fiscal Emiliano Rabina could not identify the boundaries of his properties.[17] It is thus beyond this Court's jurisdiction to review the factual finding of the Provincial Adjudicator, DARAB and the Court of Appeals that no fraud or misrepresentation attended the execution of the Deed of Absolute Transfer. Whether the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by an adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing, whether certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side, whether inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight, all these are issues of fact which may not be passed upon in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[18] The Court is not a trier of facts.[19] It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence.[20] The jurisdiction of this Court over cases brought to it is limited to the review and rectification of errors allegedly committed by the lower courts.[21] The recognized exceptions are not here present.[22] Hence, the general rule holds true in the present Petition.
	GR NO. 171048 2007-07-31	RUDY A. PALECPEC v. CORAZON C. DAVIS IN HER CAPACITY AS REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR PER CURIAM
But when is the Court faced with a question of law? We have differentiated a question of law from a question of fact, thus, "[t]here is a question of law when doubts or differences arise as to what law pertains to a certain state of facts, and a question of fact when the doubt pertains to the truth or falsity of alleged facts."[25] A question of fact arises when "there is need for a calibration of the evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses and the existence and the relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation."[26]
	GR NO. 145871 2006-01-31	LEONIDES C. DIÑO v. LINA JARDINES AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In the case at bar, the stipulated interest rate is 6% per month, or 72% per annum. By the standards set in the above-cited cases, this stipulation is similarly invalid. x x x.[18] Applying the afore-cited rulings to the instant case, the inescapable conclusion is that the agreed interest rate of 9% per month or 108% per annum, as claimed by respondent; or 10% per month or 120% per annum, as claimed by petitioner, is clearly excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. Although respondent admitted that she agreed to the interest rate of 9%, which she believed was exorbitant, she explained that she was constrained to do so as she was badly in need of money at that time. As declared in the Medel case[19] and Imperial vs. Jaucian,[20] "[i]niquitous and unconscionable stipulations on interest rates, penalties and attorney's fees are contrary to morals." Thus, in the present case, the rate of interest being charged on the principal loan of P165,000.00, be it 9% or 10% per month, is void. The CA correctly reduced the exhorbitant rate to "legal interest."
	GR NOS. 150773 & 153599 2005-09-30	SPS. DAVID B. CARPO AND RECHILDA S. CARPO v. ELEANOR CHUA TINGA, J.
In a long line of cases, this Court has invalidated similar stipulations on interest rates for being excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. In Solangon v. Salazar,[10] we annulled the stipulation of 6% per month or 72% per annum interest on a P60,000.00 loan. In Imperial v. Jaucian,[11] we reduced the interest rate from 16% to 1.167% per month or 14% per annum. In Ruiz v. Court of Appeals,[12] we equitably reduced the agreed 3% per month or 36% per annum interest to 1% per month or 12% per annum interest. The 10% and 8% interest rates per month on a P1,000,000.00 loan were reduced to 12% per annum in Cuaton v. Salud.[13] Recently, this Court, in Arrofo v. Quino,[14] reduced the 7% interest per month on a P15,000.00 loan amounting to 84% interest per annum to 18% per annum.
	GR No. 145794 2005-01-26	LOURDES S. ARROFO v. PEDRO QUIÑO CARPIO, J.
reduce this interest rate to 18% per annum.[36] WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM with modification the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 16 October 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53733. Respondent Pedro Quiño shall pay 18% interest per annum on his
	GR No. 148753 2004-07-30	NEW SAMPAGUITA BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK PANGANIBAN, J.
"While the Usury Law[32] ceiling on interest rates was lifted by [Central Bank] Circular No. 905,[33] nothing in the said Circular grants lenders carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets."[34] In fact, we have declared nearly ten years ago that neither this Circular nor PD 1684, which further amended the Usury Law, "authorized either party to unilaterally raise the interest rate without the other's consent."[35]

RESTITUTA M. IMPERIAL v. ALEX A. JAUCIAN