This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2015-02-18 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| This court has since applied the Molina guidelines in deciding cases for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity.[26] In all psychological incapacity cases resolved from 1997 to 2009 applying the Molina guidelines, only the parties in Antonio v. Reyes[27] were found to have complied with all the requirements of Molina.[28] | |||||
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2012-11-12 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| "Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on this Court."[57] However, this rule admits of certain exceptions such as when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures or when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts.[58] As this case falls under these exceptions, the Court is constrained to re-examine the factual findings of the lower courts. | |||||
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2010-12-08 |
BRION, J. |
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| Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.[35] Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially where the prices of evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital duties. | |||||
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2010-08-03 |
BRION, J. |
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| Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a squanderer and an adulteress. We do not, however, find Ricardo's characterizations of his wife sufficient to constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal, or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.[21] | |||||
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2010-04-15 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Doubtless, the private respondent was far from being a perfect wife and a good mother. She certainly had some character flaws. But these imperfections do not warrant a conclusion that she had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital and family duties and obligations.[11] | |||||
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2010-03-10 |
BRION, J. |
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| Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage; that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[25] It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor - an adverse integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations - must be shown.[26] Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.[27] | |||||
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2009-08-14 |
BRION, J. |
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| A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be applied retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in any pending matter any procedural lapse on the certification prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes[27] and Navales v. Navales[28] have since confirmed and clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline on the matter of certification, although Article 48 mandates the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the parties would take place. Thus, what is important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that he be certified to be present. From this perspective, the petitioner's objection regarding the Molina guideline on certification lacks merit. | |||||
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2009-06-05 |
BRION, J. |
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| Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case here of parties who have very human faults and frailties; who have been together for some time; and who are now tired of each other. If in fact the respondent does not want to provide the support expected of a wife, the cause is not necessarily a grave and incurable psychological malady whose effects go as far as to affect her capacity to provide marital support promised and expected when the marital knot was tied. To be tired and to give up on one's situation and on one's husband are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is still a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation - a relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties, or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless to provide any permanent remedy. To use the words of Navales v. Navales:[50] | |||||