This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2015-02-24 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, "[t]he State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service[.]" This, however, does not guarantee "a constitutional right to run for or hold public office[.]"[36] To run for public office is a mere "privilege subject to limitations imposed by law."[37] Among these limitations is the prohibition on nuisance candidates. | |||||
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2015-02-24 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy "to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."[38] In Pamatong v. Commission on Elections,[39] this court explained why nuisance candidates are prohibited from running for public office: . . . The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. . . . | |||||
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2010-01-11 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| In elections for national positions such as President, Vice-President and Senator, the sheer logistical challenge posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for the Commission to exercise its authority to eliminate nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial capacity or serious intention to mount a nationwide campaign. Thus we explained in Pamatong v. Commission on Elections[23]: "The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held: | |||||
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2009-02-26 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The Court is not impressed. Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. By its very title, Article II is a statement of general ideological principles and policies. It is not a source of enforceable rights.[23] In Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,[24] the Court held that Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In that case, the Court held that "Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution specifically, Sections 5 x x x and 18 the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing." | |||||