This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2012-02-08 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Interestingly, ETPI never presented countervailing evidence to refute ETEU's claim that the company has been continuously paying bonuses since 1975 up to 2002 regardless of its financial state. Its failure to controvert the allegation, when it had the opportunity and resources to do so, works in favor of ETEU. Time and again, it has been held that should doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.[23] | |||||
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2007-08-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The above-quoted NLRC Decision is anchored on the substantial evidence culled from the records that swayed the reasonable mind of this Court to adopt its conclusion. Surely, petitioners cannot expect this Court to sustain its stance and accord full evidentiary weight to the documentary and testimonial evidence they adduced in the absence of clear, convincing and untarnished proof to discharge the allegations of the private respondents. Having failed in this regard, we are constrained to sustain the findings of the NLRC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals in light of the time-honored dictum that should doubt exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.[19] | |||||
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2007-04-03 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| More importantly, the letters, even if real, do not by themselves, prove that Zeta had been absent since October 13, 1998 and that his absences were without valid or justifiable reason. The best evidence of absenteeism or absence without leave (AWOL) would have been the signed original or certified true copies of Zeta's daily time records,[36] which are all accessible to NSTSI. In its Position Paper, NSTSI cited the alleged records of Zeta as basis for its claim that the latter had been on AWOL several times.[37] Yet, it did not present any such record even when this was readily available to it. Such inexplicable failure of NSTSI to adduce said evidence, even when these are within its custody, could only mean that had said evidence been produced, they would have negated the claim that Zeta had been on AWOL.[38] | |||||
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2006-06-16 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Such contention is untenable. Undeniably, this circumstance of continuous re-hiring was dictated by practical considerations that experienced crew members are more preferred. Petitioners were only given priority or preference because of their experience and qualifications but this does not detract the fact that herein petitioners are contractual employees. They can not be considered regular employees. x x x[18] The Court reiterated the Millares ruling in Gu-Miro v. Adorable[19] where it held that a radio officer on board a vessel cannot be considered as a regular employee notwithstanding that the work he performs is necessary and desirable in the business of the company. | |||||
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2005-03-14 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Such contention is untenable. Undeniably, this circumstance of continuous re-hiring was dictated by practical considerations that experienced crew members are more preferred. Petitioners were only given priority or preference because of their experience and qualifications but this does not detract the fact that herein petitioners are contractual employees. They can not be considered regular employees. We quote with favor the explanation of the NLRC in this wise: xxx The reference to "permanent" and "probationary" masters and employees in these papers is a misnomer and does not alter the fact that the contracts for enlistment between complainants-appellants and respondent-appellee Esso International were for a definite periods of time, ranging from 8 to 12 months. Although the use of the terms "permanent" and "probationary" is unfortunate, what is really meant is "eligible for-re-hire." This is the only logical conclusion possible because the parties cannot and should not violate POEA's requirement that a contract of enlistment shall be for a limited period only; not exceeding twelve (12) months. From all the foregoing, we hereby state that petitioners are not considered regular or permanent employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Petitioners' employment have automatically ceased upon the expiration of their contracts of enlistment (COE). Since there was no dismissal to speak of, it follows that petitioners are not entitled to reinstatement or payment of separation pay or backwages, as provided by law. …[43] The Court ruled that the employment of seafarers for a fixed period is not discriminatory against seafarers and in favor of foreign employers. As explained by this Court in its July 29, 2002 Resolution in Millares: Moreover, it is an accepted maritime industry practice that employment of seafarers are for a fixed period only. Constrained by the nature of their employment which is quite peculiar and unique in itself, it is for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the employer why the employment status must be contractual only or for a certain period of time. Seafarers spend most of their time at sea and understandably, they can not stay for a long and an indefinite period of time at sea. Limited access to shore society during the employment will have an adverse impact on the seafarer. The national, cultural and lingual diversity among the crew during the COE is a reality that necessitates the limitation of its period.[44] In Pentagon International Shipping, Inc. v. William B. Adelantar,[45] the Court cited its rulings in Millares and Coyoca and reiterated that a seafarer is not a regular employee entitled to backwages and separation pay: Therefore, Adelantar, a seafarer, is not a regular employee as defined in Article 280 of the Labor Code. Hence, he is not entitled to full backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement as provided in Article 279 of the Labor Code. As we held in Millares, Adelantar is a contractual employee whose rights and obligations are governed primarily by [the] Rules and Regulations of the POEA and, more importantly, by R.A. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. The latest ruling of the Court in Marcial Gu-Miro v. Rolando C. Adorable and Bergesen D.Y. Manila[46] reaffirmed yet again its rulings that a seafarer is employed only on a contractual basis: Clearly, petitioner cannot be considered as a regular employee notwithstanding that the work he performs is necessary and desirable in the business of respondent company. As expounded in the above-mentioned Millares Resolution, an exception is made in the situation of seafarers. The exigencies of their work necessitates that they be employed on a contractual basis. | |||||