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ROSITA PANGILINAN v. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 164078 2007-11-23	AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE v. ROLANDO A. AUSTRIA NACHURA, J.
In light of the foregoing disquisition, the resolution of the second question requires full cognizance of respondent's fixed term of employment and all the effects thereof. It is axiomatic that a contract of employment for a definite period terminates on its own force at the end of such period.[43] The lack of notice of termination is of no consequence because when the contract specifies the length of its duration, it comes to an end upon the expiration of such period.[44]
	GR NO. 171131 2007-07-10	NEW SUNRISE METAL CONSTRUCTION v. VICTOR PIA CARPIO MORALES, J.
Respecting the other respondents, their employment being one with a fixed period as shown by the contracts they signed, it only terminates by its own term at the end of six months[13] unless they are dismissed with just cause.[14]
	GR NO. 167714 2007-03-07	ROWELL INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION v. CA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The aforesaid Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, classifies employees into three categories, namely: (1) regular employees or those whose work is necessary or desirable to the usual business of the employer; (2) project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season; and (3) casual employees or those who are neither regular nor project employees.[13]
	GR NO. 148102 2006-07-11	BERNARDINO LABAYOG v. M.Y. SAN BISCUITS CORONA, J.
Where the duties of the employee consist of activities which are necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties are not prohibited from agreeing on the duration of employment. Article 280 does not proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period[11] provided it is not intended to circumvent the security of tenure.
	GR NO. 147790 2006-06-27	GENUINO ICE COMPANY v. ALFONSO S. MAGPANTAY AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Records show that Ducut is not an employee of the FEU Legal Aid Bureau, but is connected with the Computer Services Department. The FEU Legal Aid Bureau has its own personnel which include Ms. dela Paz who is the one authorized to receive communications in behalf of the office. It has been ruled that a service of a copy of a decision on a person who is neither a clerk nor one in charge of the attorney's office is invalid.[21] This was the Court's ruling in Cañete v. National Labor Relations Commission,[22] to wit: We have ruled that where a copy of the decision is served on a person who is neither a clerk nor one in charge of the attorney's office, such service is invalid. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Nenette Vasquez, the person who received a copy of the labor arbiter's Decision, was neither a clerk of Atty. Chua, respondent's counsel, nor a person in charge of Atty. Chua's office. Hence, her receipt of said Decision on March 15, 1993 cannot be considered as notice to Atty. Chua. Since a copy of the Decision was actually delivered by Vasquez to Atty. Chua's clerk only on March 16, 1993, it was only on this date that the ten-day period for the filing of respondent's appeal commenced to run. Thus, respondent's March 26, 1993 appeal to the NLRC was seasonably filed.[23] This was recently reiterated in Prudential Bank v. Business Assistance Group, Inc.,[24] where the Court accepted the affidavit executed by Arlan Cayno denying that he was an employee of Gella, Danguilan, Nabaza & Associates law firm authorized to receive legal or judicial processes. Cayno likewise disclaimed knowledge of the whereabouts of the notice. According to the Court, since Mr. Cayno was not an employee of the said law firm authorized to receive notices in its behalf, his alleged receipt of the notice is without any effect in law.
	GR NO. 152616 2006-03-31	PHILEMPLOY SERVICES v. ANITA RODRIGUEZ CARPIO, J.
This Court generally accords respect to the factual findings of the NLRC. However, the rule is equally settled that this Court will not uphold erroneous conclusions of the NLRC if the NLRC's findings of fact on which its conclusions are based are not supported by substantial evidence.[21] Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact in cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, is that level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[22] Factual findings of administrative agencies will be set aside if found arbitrary.[23]