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CONSUELO METAL CORPORATION v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

	GR No. 171132 2012-08-15	MANUEL D. YNGSON v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VILLARAMA, JR., J.
In the case of Consuelo Metal Corporation v. Planters Development Bank,[26] which involved factual antecedents similar to the present case, the court has already settled the above question and upheld the right of the secured creditor to foreclose the mortgages in its favor during the liquidation of a debtor corporation. In that case, Consuelo Metal Corporation (CMC) filed with the SEC a petition to be declared in a state of suspension of payment, for rehabilitation, and for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver or management committee under Section 5(d) of P.D. No. 902-A. On April 2, 1996, the SEC, finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, declared that "all actions for claims against CMC pending before any court, tribunal, office, board, body and/or commission are deemed suspended immediately until further orders" from the SEC. Then on November 29, 2000, upon the management committee's recommendation, the SEC issued an Omnibus Order directing the dissolution and liquidation of CMC. Thereafter, respondent Planters Development Bank (Planters Bank), one of CMC's creditors, commenced the extrajudicial foreclosure of CMC's real estate mortgage. Planters Bank extrajudicially foreclosed on the real estate mortgage as CMC failed to secure a TRO. CMC questioned the validity of the foreclosure because it was done without the knowledge and approval of the liquidator. The Court ruled in favor of the respondent bank, as follows: In Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that if rehabilitation is no longer feasible and the assets of the corporation are finally liquidated, secured creditors shall enjoy preference over unsecured creditors, subject only to the provisions of the Civil Code on concurrence and preference of credits. Creditors of secured obligations may pursue their security interest or lien, or they may choose to abandon the preference and prove their credits as ordinary claims.
	GR No. 161771 2012-02-15	BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. EDUARDO VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 8799, SEC Case No. 09-97-5764 was no longer pending. The SEC finally disposed of said case when it rendered on September 14, 1999 the decision disapproving the petition for suspension of payments, terminating the proposed rehabilitation plan, and ordering the dissolution and liquidation of the petitioning corporation. With the enactment of the new law, jurisdiction over the liquidation proceedings ordered in SEC Case No. 09-97-5764 was transferred to the RTC branch designated by the Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction over cases formerly cognizable by the SEC. As this Court held in Consuelo Metal Corporation v. Planters Development Bank[22]: The SEC assumed jurisdiction over CMC's petition for suspension of payment and issued a suspension order on 2 April 1996 after it found CMC's petition to be sufficient in form and substance. While CMC's petition was still pending with the SEC as of 30 June 2000, it was finally disposed of on 29 November 2000 when the SEC issued its Omnibus Order directing the dissolution of CMC and the transfer of the liquidation proceedings before the appropriate trial court. The SEC finally disposed of CMC's petition for suspension of payment when it determined that CMC could no longer be successfully rehabilitated.
	GR No. 165887 2011-06-06	MAJORITY STOCKHOLDERS OF RUBY INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION v. MIGUEL LIM VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Subsequently, in Consuelo Metal Corporation v. Planters Development Bank[79] the Court was again confronted with the same issue. The original petition filed by the debtor corporation was for suspension of payment, rehabilitation and appointment of a rehabilitation receiver or management committee. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the SEC issued an order suspending immediately all actions for claims against the petitioner pending before any court, tribunal or body until further orders from the court. It also created a management committee to undertake petitioner's rehabilitation. Four years later, upon the management committee's recommendation, the SEC issued an omnibus order directing the dissolution and liquidation of the petitioner, and that the proceedings on and implementation of the order of liquidation be commenced at the Regional Trial Court to which the case was transferred. However, the trial court refused to act on the motion filed by the petitioner who requested for the issuance of a TRO against the extrajudicial foreclosure initiated by one of its creditors. The trial court ruled that since the SEC had already terminated and decided on the merits the petition for suspension of payment, the trial court no longer had legal basis to act on petitioner's motion. It likewise denied the motion for reconsideration stating that petition for suspension of payment could not be converted into a petition for dissolution and liquidation because they covered different subject matters and were governed by different rules. Petitioner's remedy thus was to file a new petition for dissolution and liquidation either with the SEC or the trial court.
	GR No. 160046 2009-11-27	BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. EVANGELINE L. PUZON CARPIO, J.
The Court of Appeals held that there was no proof that the conspicuous places where the notices of sale were posted were indeed public places as contemplated by law. The Court of Appeals mainly relied on the wordings of the Certificate of Posting which used the adjective "conspicuous" instead of "public" to define the places where the notices were posted. However, the Certificate of Posting also states that the copies of the Notice of Sheriff's Sale have been posted "in accordance with the provisions of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118." Under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, unless contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Foreclosure proceedings have in their favor the presumption of regularity and the party who seeks to challenge the proceedings has the burden of evidence to rebut the same.[16] In this case, respondent failed to prove her allegation that there was no compliance with the posting requirement. There was no evidence that the "conspicuous places" where the notices were posted were not "public places." In the absence of contrary evidence, the presumption prevails that the Sheriff performed his official duty of posting the notices of sale in 3 public places for no less than 20 days before the sale.[17] Furthermore, the date of the Notice of Sheriff's Sale[18] was 29 January 1992, which is more that 20 days from the scheduled public auction of the foreclosed property on 26 February 1992.