This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2015-10-19 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The CA declared the assailed orders of Judge Lee and Judge Baclig to be in clear defiance of the Court's decision in G.R. No. 159962.[14] It pronounced that Judge Lee erred in opining that the Court had only sustained in G.R. No. 159962 the executive determination of probable cause by the DOJ, and had not touched on what appropriate crimes should have been charged against Balindong, et al.;[15] and that Judge Baclig similarly erred in holding that the Court "did not prohibit the trial judge from determining the appropriate crime to be filed against the accused [once] the cases were brought to his sala."[16] It pointed out that:There are no two ways to construe the 16 December 2004 Decision of the Supreme Court relative the appropriate charges to be filed against private respondents. In upholding the Court of Appeals' ruling that the DOJ should not have entertained a third motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court did not merely touch upon a procedural infirmity but ruled further on private respondents' material objections to the propriety of the murder charge against them. x x x | |||||
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2015-10-19 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Despite conceding that the Decision promulgated in G.R. No. 159962 had long become final and executory,[21] Balindong, et al. insist that they were not precluded from still seeking from the RTC as the trial court the judicial determination of probable cause against them because all that the Court had upheld in G.R. No. 159962 was only the executive determination of probable cause. They argue that the Court did not thereby prevent their resort to available judicial remedies, like filing the proper motions for the judicial determination of probable cause in the trial court,[22] anchoring their argument on Section 14, Rule 110, in relation to Section 19, Rule 119, both of the Rules of Court | |||||
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2015-10-19 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| It is clear that Judge Balut did not thereby disobey the decisions of the Court in G.R. No. 159962 and G.R. No. 173290. To start with, there was no indication in his Order that bad faith had moved him to suspend the implementation of the warrants of arrest against Balindong, et al., or that he had thereby acted with a willful and deliberate intent to disobey or to ignore the Court's bidding, or to cause injustice to any of the parties. In the absence of the clear showing of bad faith on his part, his being prudent could only be an error of judgment, for which he could not be held to account. Secondly, the history of the criminal cases, from the transfer of venue at the behest of Secretary Tuquero from Cagayan de Oro to Quezon City; to the successive inhibitions of several RTC Judges; to the succession of petitions for certiorari bearing on the handling of the criminal cases brought to the higher courts, including this Court,[32] must have probably persuaded Judge Balut to tread the path of prudence and caution. Indeed, he expressed in his Order of July 16, 2007 the desire "to avert any conflicting determinations" pending the promulgation of the Court's Decision in G.R. No. 177600. And, thirdly, his actuations were entirely different from those of Judge Lee's, who downgraded the offenses from two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder to double homicide with multiple frustrated homicide, and ordered the issuance of the warrants of arrest for such downgraded offenses. Judge Lee thereby directly contradicted the ruling in G.R. No. 159962. | |||||
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2013-08-13 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| As the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it, our decision in any given case constitutes the law of that particular case, from which there is no appeal.[75] The 2007 Decision bars a further repeated consideration of the very same issues that have already been settled with finality; more particularly, the illegal dismissal of respondent, as well as the amount of back wages that she was entitled to receive by reason thereof. | |||||
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2008-08-22 |
CORONA, J. |
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| In Balindong v. CA, we held that the above provision is a mandatory provision.[9] A second motion for reconsideration is prohibited for being a mere reiteration of the issues assigned and the arguments raised by the parties.[10] | |||||
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2007-09-27 |
TINGA, J, |
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| All told, the procedural lapses of the instant petition cannot be ignored. The doctrines of judicial hierarchy and res judicata are not meaningless procedural rules because they are grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[27] Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.[28] | |||||
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2007-04-02 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Petitioner is correct in pointing out that the Court has ample powers to relax the rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice and in order to allow a litigant to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint. However, concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain its failure to comply with the rules.[16] Said rules may be relaxed only in exceptionally meritorious cases.[17] | |||||
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2006-05-05 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| As a final consideration, we note that the CA had denied with finality petitioners' motion for reconsideration of its underlying March 31, 1999 decision[21] owing to the belated filing of such motion for reconsideration. To be sure, the appellate court acted within its sound discretion in denying petitioners' motion for time to file a motion for reconsideration and, consequent to such denial, denying the corresponding motion for reconsideration. But the more paramount consideration to observe in this case is the norm relaxing the rules of procedure in the broader interest of justice, thus helping litigants secure substantial justice, specially, as here, when the perceived resulting injustice is not proportionate with the parties' failure to strictly comply with the prescribed procedure.[22] | |||||
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2006-01-20 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| (a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party x x x. (Emphasis supplied) The rule is clear. In order to perfect an appeal all that is required is a pro forma notice of appeal. Perhaps due to failure to file a notice of appeal within the remaining two days of the appeal period, petitioners' counsel instead filed the instant petition. The rules of procedure, however, do not exist for the convenience of the litigants. These rules are established to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial system. They are not to be trifled with lightly or overlooked by mere expedience of invoking "substantial justice." In Balindong v. Court of Appeals [6] we stated:Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain its failure to comply with the rules. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. The enforcement of procedural rules is not antithetical to the substantive rights of the litigants. The policy of the courts is to give effect to both procedural and substantive laws, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. (Emphasis supplied) Even on the merits, petitioners' cause must still fail. The trial court dismissed the complaint due to petitioners and counsel's apparent lack of interest to prosecute the case. Petitioners' counsel argued that their repeated failure to attend the hearing was caused by conflicts in his schedule and by his lack of knowledge of the trial dates. He also contended that respondent bank and counsel have been similarly guilty thereof, and that petitioners have informed the court of ongoing negotiations for the re-purchase of the foreclosed property. Hence, petitioners invoke liberality and the primordial interest of substantial justice over the strict enforcement of the rules of technicality. | |||||