This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2012-11-12 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| This Court cannot likewise agree with the RTC's conclusion that Antonio fathered Randy merely on the basis of his admission that he had sexual encounters with Mirasol. Neither does it agree with the CA that the inconsistencies in Antonio's testimony with regard to the number of times he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol are good reasons to disregard his denials and uphold the respondents' claims. It is well to stress that as plaintiff, Mirasol has the burden of proving her affirmative allegation that Antonio is the father of her son Randy.[67] She must rely on the strength of her evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.[68] As Randy was born on November 11, 1983, it was incumbent upon Mirasol to prove that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio prior to the usual period of pregnancy or nine months before the birth of Randy. This crucial period therefore is during the early part of the first quarter of 1983. However, nothing from Mirasol's testimony indicates that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio during that time. She merely testified that she last met with Antonio in 1983 but could not remember the particular month.[69] Plainly, this hardly means anything not only because it was not established that the said meeting took place during that crucial period but also because Mirasol never mentioned that they had sexual contact during their meeting. | |||||
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2012-07-11 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| At the outset, it must be pointed out that the issues presented in this case are factual in nature and, therefore, generally not subject to review by this Court. As a rule, in the exercise of its power of review, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the reexamination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case.[38] Nevertheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the findings of fact of the lower court and the Court of Appeals are conflicting,[39] as in the case at bar. | |||||
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2010-03-03 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Petitioner asserts that the plain language of the Deed of Sale shows that it is a sale of a real estate for a lump sum, governed under Article 1542 of the Civil Code.[12] In the contract, it was stated that the land contains an area of 4,000 sq m more or less, bounded on the North by Lot No. 11903, on the East by Lot No. 11908, on the South by Lot Nos. 11858 & 11912, and on the West by Lot No. 11910. When the OCT was issued, the area of Lot No. 11909 was declared to be 14,475 sq m, with an excess of 10,475 sq m. In accordance with Article 1542, respondents are, therefore, duty-bound to deliver the whole area within the boundaries stated, without any corresponding increase in the price. Thus, petitioner concludes that she is entitled to have the certificate of title, covering the whole Lot No. 11909, which was originally issued in the names of respondents, transferred to her name. | |||||