This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2014-03-12 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Notwithstanding that the matter had already been submitted for resolution, Judge Pichay continued with the proceedings by setting the motions for hearing to the effect of unreasonably delaying the execution of the subject decision. Indeed, while it has been held that a presiding judge shall at all times remain in firm control of the proceedings, he is nevertheless mandated to adopt a policy against unwarranted delays.[45] In this case, Judge Pichay did not sufficiently explain the reasons as to why he failed to resolve the pending incidents on time, as well as to why he still had to set the same for hearing and repeatedly grant postponements therefor, either motu proprio or by motion, despite the summary nature of ejectment proceedings and the ministerial nature of the subsequent issuance of a writ of execution. These considerations he should have been fully aware of. As case law instructs, "[e]jectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property,"[46] and that "it becomes mandatory or ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment which has become executory,"[47] as in Civil Case No. 2004-286. To add, the fact that Judge Pichay required medical attention on June 7, 2010 is no excuse for his default, considering that on such date, the subject motions were already due for resolution. [48] Thus, without having duly applied for any extension before the Court, Judge Pichay was bound to resolve the pending incidents in the said case within the three (3) month-period prescribed by the Constitution. This, he, however, failed to do, and, as such, the imposition of administrative sanctions against him remains in order. | |||||
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2006-03-17 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| As the MTCC correctly stated, the only question to resolve in ejectment suits such as this case is who between the parties has the better right of possession de facto over the disputed property.[11] To resolve this issue, courts may inquire into the question of the property's ownership but only for the limited purpose of determining prior possession.[12] | |||||
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2005-10-19 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Prefatorily, this case started with a complaint for ejectment filed with the MeTC. In previous cases, this Court consistently held that the only issue for resolution in an ejectment case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants.[12] Ejectment cases are designed to summarily restore physical possession to one who has been illegally deprived of such possession, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings.[13] We also said that the question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto.[14] | |||||