This case has been cited 11 times or more.
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2013-09-02 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Evidently, the conclusions arrived at by the DOJ were neither whimsical nor capricious as to be corrected by certiorari. Even on the assumption that the DOJ Secretary made erroneous conclusions, such error alone would not subject his act to correction or annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.[24] After all, not "every erroneous conclusion of law or fact is an abuse of discretion."[25] | |||||
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2009-11-25 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act not at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[40] | |||||
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2009-10-02 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[15] It also bears stressing that the true function of the writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from the arbitrary acts of courts.[16] | |||||
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2009-03-13 |
TINGA, J. |
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| It is the consistent and general policy of the Court not to interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers.[12] The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.[13] It is within the context of this well-entrenched policy that the Court proceeds to pass upon the validity of the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman in this case. | |||||
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2008-03-14 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Hence, it is totally unnecessary for this Court to address the issue raised by petitioners concerning the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 5, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court for having been issued beyond the constitutional limitation on the rule-making power of this Court. Basic is the principle that a constitutional issue may only be passed upon if essential to the decision of a case or controversy.[54] A purported constitutional issue raised by petitioners may only be resolved if essential to the decision of a case and controversy. Even if all the requisites for judicial review are present, this Court will not entertain a constitutional question unless it is the very lis mota[55] of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the application of a statute or general law. The present problem of partition by co-heirs/co-owners can be resolved without elevating their case to one of constitutionality. | |||||
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2007-06-22 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| In arriving at their unanimous conclusion that no probable cause for libel exists the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice had deliberated on the factual and legal backdrops of the case. Their shared conclusion was arrived at neither whimsically nor capriciously as to be correctable by certiorari. Grave abuse of discretion is familiarly defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[21] Such grave abuse of discretion was not shown in the case at bar, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals. Even assuming that the Secretary of Justice may have erred in considering the subject publication as qualifiedly privileged,[22] the error does not appear to be so grave or malevolent as to be correctable by certiorari. A reading of the Justice Secretary's resolution dated April 18, 2002 shows that his supposition as to the privileged character of the subject notice was merely his riposte to the assumption that the notice was defamatory. At any rate, not every erroneous conclusion of law or fact is an abuse of discretion.[23] Erroneous inferences of fact or conclusions of law are correctable by certiorari only if they are of such a degree as to amount to a clear case of abuse of discretion of the grave and malevolent kind.[24] | |||||
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2007-06-21 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Here, petitioner's complaint is criminal in nature. In Estrada v. Desierto,[7] we held that the remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with this Court, not with the Court of Appeals. In cases when the aggrieved party is questioning the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of lack of probable cause, as in this case, there is likewise the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to be filed with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals. This rule was subsequently restated in Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon[8] where we held that the remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the Ombudsman is to file with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. | |||||
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2006-12-18 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It is in this light that the court in the case of Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines,[13] allowed the inquiry of the foreign currency deposit in question mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case such that a strict interpretation of the letter of the law would result to rank injustice. Therein, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, was charged with criminal cases for serious illegal detention and rape committed against then 12 year-old Karen Salvacion. A separate civil case for damages with preliminary attachment was filed against Greg Bartelli. The trial court issued an Order granting the Salvacions' application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. A notice of garnishment was then served on China Bank where Bartelli held a dollar account. China Bank refused, invoking the secrecy of bank deposits. The Supreme Court ruled: "In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice x x x It would be unthinkable, that the questioned law exempting foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever would be used as a device by an accused x x x for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.[14] | |||||
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2006-10-12 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| On July 20, 2005, CA issued a Resolution denying the motion, holding that the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto[22] is not applicable, as it applies only in appeals from resolutions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. The remedy of the aggrieved party from resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases is to file a petition for certiorari in this Court, and not in the CA. The applicable rule is that enunciated in Enemecio v. Ombudsman,[23] later reiterated in Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman[24] and Estrada v. Desierto.[25] | |||||
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2005-10-13 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In Estrada v. Desierto,[5] we held that the remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals. By availing of the wrong remedy, the petition should be dismissed outright. Nevertheless, we will consider the present petition as one filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court since a perusal of the contents reveals that petitioner is imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman when it issued the Resolution dated 12 January 2001 and the Order dated 17 July 2001, finding probable cause for the filing of Informations against petitioner and co-accused Robles. | |||||
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2005-10-13 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The consistent and general policy of the Court is not to interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers.[12] The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.[13] Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an Information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[14] The Court cannot interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence before it. The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence but for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the offense.[15] Hence, in the absence of a clear case of abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation. | |||||