This case has been cited 5 times or more.
|
2008-02-13 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| x x x x It must be stressed that the abovementioned provision vested concurrent jurisdiction upon the said courts regardless of the imposable penalty. In fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case of the appellant was conferred by the aforecited law then in force (R.A. 6425 before amendment) when the information was filed. Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of the action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is, to stress, prospective in nature.[20] (Emphasis supplied.) This Court categorically reiterated the above ruling in the 2003 case of Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals,[21] in the 2004 case of Alonto v. People,[22] and in the 2005 case of Lee v. Court of Appeals.[23] | |||||
|
2006-06-27 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| Thus, in Alonto v. People,[37] Dico v. Court of Appeals[38] and Ongson v. People,[39] we acquitted the accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 ("The Bouncing Checks Law") because there was a variance between the identity and date of issuance of the check alleged in the information and the check proved by the prosecution during trial: This Court notes, however, that under the third count, the information alleged that petitioner issued a check dated May 14, 1992 whereas the documentary evidence presented and duly marked as Exhibit "I" was BPI Check No. 831258 in the amount of P25,000 dated April 5, 1992. Prosecution witness Fernando Sardes confirmed petitioner's issuance of the three BPI checks (Exhibits "G," "H," and "I"), but categorically stated that the third check (BPI Check No. 831258) was dated May 14, 1992, which was contrary to that testified to by private complainant Violeta Tizon, i.e., BPI check No. 831258 dated April 5, 1992. In view of this variance, the conviction of petitioner on the third count (Criminal Case No. Q-93-41751) cannot be sustained. It is on this ground that petitioner's fourth assignment of error is tenable, in that the prosecution's exhibit, i.e., Exhibit "I" (BPI Check No. 831258 dated April 5, 1992 in the amount of P25,000) is excluded by the law and the rules on evidence. Since the identity of the check enters into the first essential element of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. 22, that is, that a person makes, draws or issues a check on account or for value, and the date thereof involves its second element, namely, that at the time of issue the maker, drawer or issuer knew that he or she did not have sufficient funds to cover the same, there is a violation of petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged in view of the aforesaid variance, thereby rendering the conviction for the third count fatally defective.[40] (Underscoring supplied) Similarly, in the case of Burgos v. Sandiganbayan,[41] we upheld the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the accusation against him in a case involving a variance between the means of committing the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 alleged in the information and the means found by the Sandiganbayan: Common and foremost among the issues raised by petitioners is the argument that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting them on a finding of fact that was not alleged in the information. They contend that the information charged them with having allowed payment of P83,850 to Ricardo Castañeda despite being aware and knowing fully well that the surveying instruments were not actually repaired and rendered functional/operational. However, their conviction by the Sandiganbayan was based on the finding that the surveying instruments were not repaired in accordance with the specifications contained in the job orders. | |||||
|
2006-06-16 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 11, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. The afore-cited rule is inapplicable to the case at bar for the simple reason that there was no mistake in charging the proper offense in the original information. As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan: [I]t is hardly necessary for this Court to order the dismissal of the original information and then direct the filing of a new one "charging the proper offense". The reason for this is obvious. The prosecution did not commit a mistake in charging the proper offense; rather, it merely failed to file an information sufficient to charge the offense it intended to charge, namely, violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. Section 14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure apparently relied upon by accused Cabo contemplates a situation where the accused will be charged with an offense different from or is otherwise not necessarily included in the offense charged in the information to be dismissed by the Court. In the case at bar, however, accused Cabo will not be charged with a different offense or with an offense that is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the original information, but with the very same offense that the prosecution intended to charge her in the first place, that is, violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.[28] All told, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the re-arraignment of petitioner on the amended information. Double jeopardy did not attach by virtue of petitioner's "conditional arraignment" on the first information. It is well-settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.[29] The first and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar. | |||||
|
2005-08-12 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| As held in Dico v. Court of Appeals,[33] citing Alonto v. People,[34] these inconsistencies justify the acquittal of the accused. Thus - | |||||
|
2005-02-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| In the case of Alonto v. People,[30] this Court had this to say when there was a variance involving the date as regards the check described in the information and that adduced in evidence:This Court notes, however, that under the third count, the information alleged that petitioner issued a check dated 14 May 1992 whereas the documentary evidence presented and duly marked as Exhibit "I" was BPI Check No. 831258 in the amount of P25,000 dated 05 April 1992. Prosecution witness Fernando Sardes confirmed petitioner's issuance of the three BPI checks (Exhibits G, H, and I), but categorically stated that the third check (BPI Check No. 831258) was dated 14 May 1992, which was contrary to that testified to by private complainant Violeta Tizon, i.e., BPI check No. 831258 dated 05 April 1992. In view of this variance, the conviction of petitioner on the third count (Criminal Case No. Q-93-41751) cannot be sustained. It is on this ground that petitioner's fourth assignment of error is tenable, in that the prosecution's exhibit, i.e., Exhibit "I" (BPI Check No. 831258 dated 05 April 1992 in the amount of P25,000) is excluded by the law and the rules on evidence. Since the identity of the check enters into the first essential element of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. 22, that is, that a person makes, draws or issues a check on account or for value, and the date thereof involves its second element, namely, that at the time of issue the maker, drawer or issuer knew that he or she did not have sufficient funds to cover the same, there is a violation of petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged in view of the aforesaid variance, thereby rendering the conviction for the third count fatally defective. | |||||