This case has been cited 13 times or more.
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2015-04-20 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| It needs to be restated, too, that the mere act of committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed[13] and was duly alleged in the Information against petitioner. | |||||
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2014-04-23 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| 3. The child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.[31] | |||||
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2013-11-11 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In paragraph (b), the following requisites must concur: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female is below eighteen (18) years of age.[66] This paragraph "punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct."[67] | |||||
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2013-06-10 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| In its Comment,[20] respondent advances the argument that there was "sexual abuse" within the purview of RA 7610 as well as the Rules on Child Abuse Cases since it was only upon Caballo's repeated assurances and persuasion that AAA gave in to his worldly desires. Likewise, it points out that the sweetheart theory, as relied on by Caballo, deserves scant consideration in view of the Court's ruling in Malto v. People (Malto).[21] | |||||
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2013-03-13 |
REYES, J. |
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| It is well-settled that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[24] In this respect, the designation in the Information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.[25] In the instant case, the designation of the offense in the Information against Pielago was changed from the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 to the crime of rape by sexual assault penalized under Article 266-A(2)[26] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. It cannot be said, however, that his right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated. This Court is not unaware that the Information was worded, as follows: "x x x commit an act of lasciviousness upon the person of [AAA], a minor being four (4) years old, by kissing the vagina and inserting one of his fingers to the vagina of AAA, x x x." And, as correctly explained by the CA, the factual allegations contained in the Information determine the crime charged against the accused and not the designation of the offense as given by the prosecutor which is merely an opinion not binding to the courts. As held in Malto v. People:[27] | |||||
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2013-03-13 |
REYES, J. |
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| It is well-settled that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[24] In this respect, the designation in the Information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.[25] In the instant case, the designation of the offense in the Information against Pielago was changed from the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 to the crime of rape by sexual assault penalized under Article 266-A(2)[26] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. It cannot be said, however, that his right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated. This Court is not unaware that the Information was worded, as follows: "x x x commit an act of lasciviousness upon the person of [AAA], a minor being four (4) years old, by kissing the vagina and inserting one of his fingers to the vagina of AAA, x x x." And, as correctly explained by the CA, the factual allegations contained in the Information determine the crime charged against the accused and not the designation of the offense as given by the prosecutor which is merely an opinion not binding to the courts. As held in Malto v. People:[27] | |||||
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2012-09-24 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.[22] | |||||
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2012-06-18 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| In the light of all the foregoing, there is a need to modify the penalty imposed upon appellant. Following the pronouncement in the case of Malto v. People[14] for sexual abuse, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the Court finds it appropriate to impose the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, which has the range of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years. | |||||
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2011-06-06 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. [42] | |||||
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2010-03-03 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also where one -- through coercion, intimidation or influence -- engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child.[44] | |||||
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2010-02-11 |
CORONA, J. |
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| The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the offense.[40] What controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the Information.[41] In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the Information.[42] It is the exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is named.[43] The determination by the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which is not binding on the court.[44] | |||||
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2009-10-13 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.[48] | |||||
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2009-01-19 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| But even if we were to ignore petitioner's procedural transgressions, the petition must still be dismissed for lack of merit. As correctly argued by the City Prosecutor, the questioned informations separately charge two distinct offenses of child abuse--Criminal Case No. SJC-78-04 for child abuse committed through the use of threatening words, and Criminal Case No. SJC-79-04 for child abuse through the infliction of physical injuries. Thus, contrary to his contention, petitioner is not in jeopardy of being convicted of grave threats and child abuse in the first case, and slight physical injuries and child abuse in the second. Though the crimes were erroneously designated, the averments in the informations clearly make out an offense of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.[21] Under the said law, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes psychological and physical abuse, cruelty, emotional maltreatment or any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being.[22] In the first information, petitioner is charged with child abuse by uttering debasing, demeaning and degrading words to the minor. In the second, he is charged with child abuse by inflicting physical injuries that debase, demean and degrade the dignity of the children as human beings. What controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited therein.[23] Moreover, an information is not duplicitous if it charges several related acts, all of which constitute a single offense, although the acts may in themselves be distinct offenses.[24] The specific acts are only alleged to complete the narration of facts.[25] | |||||